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ABSTRACT
Based on the economic theory of regulation, our model portrays U.S. senators 
as utility-maximizing agents and the American Medical Association (AMA) as a rational 
contributor. We use contributions from the AMA’s political arm. the American 
Political Action Committee (AMPAC), and roll call votes in the U.S. Senate from 
1979-1992 to test for AMPAC contributions effects, to test the hypothesis that the AMA 
“rewards” senators for their voting behavior, and to determine the role of issue 
specificity. We use pooled, cross-sectional data in a simultaneous Probit-Tobit- 
Generalized Least Squares framework and extend the traditional analyses by examining 
alternative timing specifications, election year and nonelection year samples, and Senate 
committee members and nonmembers. We obtain estimates of the standard errors by 
using bootstrap procedures which does not rely on asymptotic assumptions.
We find no strong evidence that the AMA is successful in capturing legislation 
nor any evidence that the AMA rewards (or punishes) voting behavior. There is weak 
evidence that senators respond to future AMA contributions when voting on bills 
especially important to the AMA. We also find weak evidence that (future) key votes 
explain AMA contributions. Tests show that the underlying process generating AMA 
contributions is different for election years and nonelection years, and for Senate 
committee members and nonmembers.
ix
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INTRODUCTION
The American Medical Association (AMA) is often viewed as one of the most 
powerful interest groups in Washington, both in the popular and academic literature.1 
The political arm of the AMA, the American Medical Political Action Committee 
(AMPAC), is the health industry’s largest political committee. Table 1.1 indicates the 
AMA’s contributions to congressional candidates over the 1977-1992 period. The 
AMA continues to be a major political contributor. In 1991-92, the AMA contributed 
over $2.8 million in real dollars to congressional candidates. The AMA was the third 
overall largest PAC contributor in 1988, second to the National Association of Realtors 
and the Teamsters Union. If contributions do influence policy, then the AMA’s 
reputation may be well founded. On the other hand, if AMA contributions do not 
affect roll call votes, is the power of the AMA being overestimated and is the AMA 
contributing in a rational manner?
The economic theory of regulation models political interest groups as competing 
for favorable legislation by contributing time and money to candidates in hopes of being 
rewarded when the legislator votes on bills of interest to the group (Stigler. 1971; 
Peltzman, 1976; Becker, 1983). Interest groups contribute to "buy" favorable 
legislation, which legislators supply to remain in office (i.e., get re-elected). The 
market for legislation is competitive, with various interest groups and constituencies
1 Sorauf (1988) describes AMPAC as “formidable” (page 73) and “affluent" 
(page 119). Sabato (1984) calls AMPAC a “pacesetter” and “successful” (page 6). 
Keiser and Jones (1986) conclude “the AMA is indeed a potent political force” (page 
766).
1
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Table 1
AMA Contributions to Congressional Candidates 
(in Real Dollars, base year 1982)
Year Republican Democrat Total
1977-78 $ 1,813,810 $ 798,128 $2,611,938
1979-80 1,387,511 464,833 1,852,344
1981-82 1,444,387 586,146 2.030,532
1983-84 1,442,980 768.025 2.211,004
1985-86 2,170,443 1.167.843 3.338,285
1987-88 1,374,924 1,289,785 2,664,709
1989-90 924,627 898,048 1,822,675
1991-92 1,538,098 1.284.972 2.823,070
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pressuring Congress for favorable legislation. It is the interaction of these demand and 
supply forces that is realized when bills are voted into law.
This self-interest model of simultaneous economic and political concerns raises 
several questions: What effect, if any, do campaign contributions have on legislative 
outcomes? Are interest groups successful in capturing regulation? Are votes on certain 
types of legislation affected differently by interest groups ? Do legislators punish groups 
who contribute to their opponents by voting against bills supported by the interest 
group? What determines contributing behavior? What is the proper specification for the 
timing of votes and contributions?
This study serves several purposes. Our primary goals are to determine the 
effects of AMA contributions and membership on roll call votes in the Senate and to 
test the hypothesis that the AMA contributes to senators based on their voting records, 
an assumption often made but seldom tested. We also want to determine if issue 
specificity plays a role in how successful the AMA is in capturing legislation. With 
these goals in mind, we analyze pooled, cross-sectional data and extend the traditional 
analyses by examining alternative specifications based on the timing of votes and 
contributions, and by examining election year versus nonelection year data. Lastly, 
we consider the importance of senate committees in affecting our conclusions about the 
effects of AMA contributions on roll call votes.
We base this study on previous models of roll call votes. However, the value- 
added of our study to the existing models of PAC influence is based on the following 
points.
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The methodology used in this study avoids the potential bias present in other 
studies. Simultaneous Probit-Tobit-generalized stage least squares estimation techniques 
are used to examine Senate votes, AMA contributions, and constituency voting, 
respectively. Bootstrapping is used to estimate standard errors. The bootstrap method 
identifies potential bias in estimators and provides more reliable finite sample standard 
errors.2 Bootstrapping represents an improvement in testing hypotheses over that 
used in previous studies of interest group behavior.
A measure of opposition strength is incorporated where possible. Theory 
suggests that the AMA’s success in capturing votes depends inversely on the strength 
of opposition. Contributions from interest groups who oppose the AMA stance on a 
vote are included to avoid understating AMA influence. We include contributions from 
interest groups who support the AMA stance to avoid overstating the AMA's impact 
on votes.
We use a sample of forty-two roll call votes: previous studies use substantially 
fewer votes. The AMA identifies most votes used in this study in its Compendium o f 
Statements, and, by using this as our source, we avoid researcher bias in issue 
identification. In addition to estimating individual vote equations, we use several vote 
indices in order to capture a broader range of issues. The use of vote indices assumes 
the AMA considers the overall voting record (on bills of interest to the AMA) of a 
senator rather than a single vote in making contribution decisions.
2 Freedman and Peters (1984).
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We create a full vote index using the total sample of votes. The votes differ in 
their degree of effect on the AMA membership. Therefore, votes are separated into 
two categories; narrow if the issue affects AMA membership economically or 
practically, and broad if the issue is of a broad social nature and the AMA has 
announced a stance. We then use the narrow vote index and the broad vote index 
separately in the contributions equation.
Previous studies have not examined the issue of grudge-bearing, although the 
possibility of its existence in determining congressional behavior has been noted.J We 
test the hypothesis that a senator "punishes" the AMA for contributing substantially to 
her opponent by voting against the AMA stance.
The data permit us to test three alternative hypotheses concerning the timing of 
contributions; the AMA rewards senators for voting pro-AM A in the past 
congressional session, the AMA rewards pro-voting behavior in the current session, or 
the AMA contributes to buy future votes. By estimating and comparing these 
alternative models, we hope to determine the effects of AMA contributions on votes 
(and of votes on contributions) over different time periods.
The demand for campaign funds changes during campaign cycles. A senator 
facing an upcoming election increases her demand for funds and the underlying 
structure of the model of votes and contributions may change. The data are structured 
in a way to test the hypothesis of structural changes across election cycles.
3 Kau, Keenan, and Rubin (1982) recommend examination of this issue though 
they do not incorporate grudge-bearing specifically in their model.
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In the next section, we describe the American Medical Political Action 
Committee and campaign contributions.
American Medical Political Action Committee
Officially organized in 1848, the AMA began considering the formation of a 
political action committee in 1958. A 1925 federal law4 forbids corporations from 
making contributions to or expenditures on behalf of candidates for federal office, 
although it did not prohibit unincorporated committees from doing the same. 
Committees could accept donations from corporations for political education purposes 
and voluntary gifts from individuals for use in elections. After observing the political 
force of labor through the AFL-CIO. the council and board of the AMA approved the 
formation of the American Medical Political Action Committee (AMPAC) in May of 
1961. It was initially created as a non-profit, voluntary, bipartisan, unincorporated 
committee, whose stated purpose was to build a strong bipartisan, conservative coalition 
in Congress. Support came from state and local medical societies, as direct 
membership dues to the AMA could not be used for contributions. Individual donations 
of $99 or less were also accepted.
During this study’s observation period, PAC contributions are limited to $5,000 
per candidate per year, although levels of "soft money", independent expenditures, and 
other services (such as research and campaign strategies) are unlimited by law. "Soft 
money" is any contribution not regulated by federal election laws, such as money 
donated to state and local party organizations, or to the national parties but specifically
4 The Corrupt Practices Act of 1925.
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earmarked for their local affiliates. The use of "soft money" may only be used to 
support state and/or local activities or activities jointly supporting state/local and federal 
candidates. Independent expenditures are funds spent independently by a PAC to 
support or oppose a candidate by name, but cannot be made in conjunction with or in 
coordination with the campaign or staff of any candidate.
A Congressional Review Committee, consisting of the AMPAC chairman and 
two to three other directors, decides which candidates AMPAC will support (or 
oppose). Recommendations are then made to the AMPAC board for final action. 
AMPAC claims to have influenced House and Senate elections5, although affecting 
legislation per se has never been a stated goal of AMPAC.
Previous Research and Literature Review
Roll call votes and contributions have been modeled as both single and multiple 
equations, with some studies using a single vote or several vote outcomes and some 
using a vote index of “correct" votes. Single equation estimation assumes one-way 
causality and treats the error terms from the vote and contribution equations as 
independent. If votes and contributions are jointly determined, the errors may not be 
independent, and single equation estimates are biased and inconsistent. Simultaneous 
equation models take the dependence of random errors and explanatory variables into 
consideration and produce consistent estimates. Statistical inference from single equation 
estimation may be misleading, and simultaneous methods are preferred.6
5 Campion, (1984).
6 For a discussion of the econometric problems of single equation estimation of 
a system of equations, see Judge et al., (1988) Chapter 14.
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The examination of single votes has been criticized as being dependent on the 
issue selected, and if that issue does not represent a group’s overall interests, then the 
results could be misleading (Wilhite. 1988). The same argument holds for the selection 
of a few votes. If PAC influence is significant in determining relatively few vote 
outcomes, this does not imply overall success in “buying votes". In addition to this 
potential problem of overstating results, self-selection bias may exist due to the choice 
of votes analyzed. Researchers may select votes which they believe are most likely to 
be affected by interest group pressure. A PAC such as AMPAC has multidimensional 
concerns which may not be captured by the researcher’s selection of individual vote 
outcomes. Using a vote index, preferably consisting of votes identified by the PAC 
itself, produces results over a series of decisions deemed important to the PAC. Of 
course, AMPAC could take public positions only on issues over which they have some 
influence. If so. this study’s results would be biased toward showing a strong AMPAC 
influence. Because our empirical results inicate no such strength, we believe our 
selection of votes is unbiased.
In the following section, we review previous roll call vote studies. We 
categorize them according to method of estimation employed and definition of the vote 
variable (actual roll call vote or vote index). The conclusions about PAC influence 
vary over these studies.




Paul Feldstein (1984) examines the role of contributions by the AMA and state 
medical political action committees (MEDPACs)7 in determining one legislative 
outcome, the Gephardt Amendment, which was a substitute amendment to the Hospital 
Cost Containment bill of 1979. Most important to health-providers, the amendment 
eliminated from the bill mandatory revenue limits. Feldstein reports that contributions 
affect legislation, but the impact is small. AMPAC is not separated from other medical 
association PACs, so its specific influence can not be identified. Only the vote equation 
is analyzed; the determinants of contribution behavior are not included in the study.
In another study that examines the role of health PACs. Keith Mueller (1986) 
analyzes nine health policy votes in the House of Representatives between 1973 and 
1980. AMA lobbying strength (as measured by membership in state and local medical 
societies) is significant in a majority of the votes analyzed, while PAC influence doesn't 
become significant until 1979. (Contributions are measured as a percentage of total 
contributions and a contributions equation is not estimated). Mueller concludes 
ideology is the most important factor determining votes.
Alan Neustadtl (1990) uses votes during the first session of the 99th Congress 
to examine pro-labor and pro-business influence. Logistic regression of the two models
7 In his discussion of groups affected by the President’s hospital cost 
containment proposal, Feldstein states that hospital associations and the AMA are the 
main lobbyists opposed to the bill. However, it is unclear exactly what PACs are 
included in “MEDPACs".
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
10
(one for labor, one for business) includes "visibility" of the issue as a dependent 
variable. He finds labor contributions are significantly related to labor vote outcomes, 
but the influence is small. Business contributions do not significantly affect vote 
outcomes. Contributions equations are not included in the study.
Vote Index
A study that specifically looks at the influence of AMA contributions is by K. 
Robert Keiser and Woodrow Jones, Jr. (1986). The Gephardt Amendment vote is the 
principal dependent variable, and an index of pro-AMA voting on three bills is also 
analyzed. Ideology and party affiliation are the most important determinants of voting 
behavior. AMA contributions are not significant in the Gephardt Amendment equation. 
They are significant in the analysis of the vote index, suggesting that contributions have 
a larger impact over a series of issues than on a single vote. The authors note the 
possibility of simultaneity bias and, therefore, assume contributions received in the 
prior cycle affect current voting behavior. But if contributions are endogenous, then 
the error terms will correlated with contributions. A valuable contribution of this study 
is the examination of committee action as well as roll call votes. Keiser and Jones find 
that AMA contributions have a significant effect on committee decisions. They note 
that, while party and ideology have similar influences in both domains, committees are 
smaller and lesser visible arenas of action.
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Multiple Equation Models
Roll Call Votes
Henry Chappell (1982) recognizes the econometric problems of a model of 
simultaneous voting and contributing behavior. He estimates a two equation model, 
incorporating the dichotomous nature of the vote variable, the non-negativity constraint 
on contributions, and the possible correlation between the error terms and the 
explanatory variables. Seven votes from 1974 through 1977 are analyzed, each 
identified with a particular interest group. Full information maximum likelihood 
estimates of contributions effects are smaller than single equation estimates. Chappell 
is unable to conclude that contributions significantly affect vote outcomes, but finds 
ideology and constituent interests to be significant. Votes are not included as an 
explanatory variable in the contributions equation. The significant determinants of 
contributions are incumbency (a positive effect), election margin (a negative effect), 
and ideology.
Thomas Stratmann (1991) recognizes the need to incorporate (1) the endogeneity 
of PAC contributions in the vote equation, (2) the censored nature of the contributions 
variable, and (3) the dichotomous nature of the vote variable. He uses the method of 
full information maximum likelihood to estimate simultaneous Probit-Tobit equations 
of farm votes and contributions from the farm sector. PAC contributions are significant 
in eight out of ten votes. He shows that relatively small amounts of contributions can 
have important effects on vote outcomes. Stratmann argues that legislative attempts to 
reduce PAC influence on congressional voting behavior would have to include sizable
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reductions in the maximum allowable contribution in order to achieve its goals. Voting 
behavior is not included in the contributions equation.
James Kau, Donald Keenan, and Paul Rubin (1982) model the behavior of 
congressmen, contributors, and voters in a three-equation system. Eight bills in 1979 
are identified with corresponding interest groups. (The Gephardt Amendment is 
included). The predicted values of votes, contributions, and election margin estimated 
from a first stage are used in the second stage of estimation. Business and labor PAC 
contributions are significant in six out of eight votes, while contributions from the 
health industry are significant in only one of four votes, the significant impact being on 
the Gephardt Amendment.
Kau et al. include voting behavior (a vote index of conservative votes) in the 
contributions equation, along with party, the loser’s total contributions (contributions 
received by the Congressman’s opponent in the last election), a dummy variable equal 
to one if the congressman was in a primary, and a measure of seniority. The vote 
index significantly impacts contributions, suggesting that the simultaneous model is 
appropriate.
Vote Index
Allen Wilhite and John Theilmann (1987) and Allen Wilhite (1988) find that 
organized labor contributions influence labor legislation in some voting cycles, but in 
others. Instead of using individual vote outcomes as the dependent variable, they 
construct a pro-union voting probability based on the AFL-CIO’s Committee on 
Political Education (COPE) ranking system, thereby avoiding potential researcher bias.
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In 1980 and 1982, labor contributions significantly affect the probability of voting pro­
union, but not in 1984. Contributions are significantly affected by the probability of 
voting pro-labor, supporting the hypothesis that the tendency to vote pro-labor and labor 
PAC contributions are simultaneously determined.
Gregory Saltzman (1987) uses COPE scores as a dependent variable in a two- 
stage least squares estimation of pro-labor congressional votes and labor PAC 
contributions. In recognizing the problem of double truncation of the COPE variable. 
Saltzman employs a two-limit Tobit analysis, but in so doing, he cannot control for the 
simultaneity bias. Labor PAC contributions have a significant, but small, impact on 
COPE scores. He argues that the overall impact is substantially greater due to the 
indirect influence through election outcomes. COPE scores significantly affect 
contributions, although this effect may be overstated due to the omission of ideology 
variables.
Frank Davis (1993) finds PAC influence on votes affecting the railroad industry 
and the airline industry. Individual roll call votes are not directly analyzed, rather a 
"roll call support index" is created for each industry, ranging from -3 to 3. (Three 
votes of interest for each PAC are used). Two-stage least squares estimation is used, 
with "contribution scores" calculated from the first stage included in the second-stage 
vote equation as an instrumental variable. The vote index based on only 3 votes may 
not capture the general interests of the PACs. Votes are not included in the 
contributions equations, although key committee membership is. The estimated first 
stage contributions equations are not reported.
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In reviewing the various methodologies presented above, we find that single 
equation models tend to overstate the significance of PAC influence, while the 
simultaneous models produce mixed results. The two studies that use multiple 
equations and individual votes (Chappell and Stratmann) produce opposite results, 
perhaps due to self-selection bias. Studies using the best design, multiple equation and 
vote index, also produce mixed results. Overall, the results from these studies raise 
serious doubts about the ability of interest groups to influence roll call votes. Our study 
examines AMP AC’s influence on roll call votes in the U. S. Senate for the 1979-1992 
period.
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CHAPTER 1
TRADITIONAL MODEL OF SENATE ROLL CALL VOTES 
AND AMA CONTRIBUTIONS
1.1 Introduction
The traditional models used in roll call vote analyses assume congressmen 
respond to last period’s contributions. Contributions are a function of current votes. 
Assuming that voting behavior is instantly observable, but contribution reporting is 
lagged, this specification is appropriate. We assume this model specification in this 
chapter.
We propose a three-equation model in which senators vote on bills of interest 
to the American Medical Association (AMA), the American Medical Political Action 
Committee (AMPAC) contributes to senators, and constituents elect candidates to the 
Senate. The direction of causality between Senators’ votes and AMA contributions is 
unclear a priori. Senators may vote in response to contributions while the AMA 
contributes to particular senators based on their voting performance. The same 
concept applies to roll call votes and constituency support. As is common in roll call 
vote analyses, we assume that senators respond to contributions received in the previous 
period, i.e., senators “reward” contributors, that the AMA contributes 
contemporaneously to affect vote outcomes, and that constituents vote for senators 
contemporaneously.
In the next section, we develop the system of equations to be estimated. The 
equations are essentially reduced-form equations implicitly derived from the underlying 
structural (demand and supply) equations for votes, contributions, and vote margins.
15
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Many of the control variables included in the system affect both the demand and the 
supply of the left-hand side variable. We cannot, a priori, hypothesize the direction of 
effects for these variables in the reduced-form equations. We recognize the restrictions 
placed on us by using such a model of reduced-form equations, but do not feel that 
these problems compromise our results.
1.2 Senator Behavior
The vote equation is based on a senator’s unobservable, expected utility 
functions when he votes pro-AMA (VOTE;= l)  and when he votes against the AMA 
stance (VOTEj=0). The utility functions are assumed to be linear. Senator i's 
expected utilities from voting against the AMA stance and voting pro-AMA and are, 
respectively.
Ui0* =  E(Ui0) + ei0 and Uu * = E(UU) + en .
The observed vote is
VOTEj = 1 if U;i* > Ui0*
= 0 i f U n * < Ui0*
The probability of senator i voting pro-AMA is
Pr[VOTEj =  l] = PrtU;!* > Ui0* ]
= Pr[(ei0 - eu ) <_(U a * - Ui0*)]
= Pr[(ei0 - eH) < XV{(3V]
= F(XVj‘|Sv).
Pr[VOTEj=0] = 1 - F(XVi’/3v)
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where Xv; is a matrix of factors determining the difference between the expected 
utilities of voting pro-AMA and against the AMA. 0V is the vector of corresponding 
(unknown) parameters.
Assuming that the errors ei0 and e;i are bivariate normal, F(Xvi'0 v) is the 
cumulative distribution function for a standard normal random variable and Probit is 
used for estimation.
The vote equation to be estimated is
VOTE =
1 with Prob Pt = F(XV’/3V)
0 with Prob 1-P: (1.1)
The factors assumed to influence the probability of voting pro-AMA (Xv) are 
contributions received in the previous period (AMA$ ), the percentage of the senator's 
state doctor population that belongs to the AMA (%AMA), the contributions received 
from other interest groups in the last period (OTHGRPS). a measure of synergistic 
effects between the AMA and other interest groups (SYNERGY=AMA$ X 
OTHGRPS), the AMA’s contributions to the senator’s opponent last period 
(AMAOPPS), the margin by which the senator won in the last election (VOTE 
MARGIN), the political party of the senator (PARTY = 1 if Republican, 0 if Democrat), 
the senator’s American for Democratic Action rating (ADA), the total years the senator 
has been in the Senate (TENURE), the percentage of the senator’s state population that 
is 65 years of age or older (%ELDERLY), the real per capita income of the senator’s 
state (INCOME), and the region of the country that the senator represents (EAST,
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SOUTH, MIDWEST). The following section describes the anticipated effects of these 
variables on voting behavior.
1.2.1 Interest Group Variables
A senator’s objective is to get re-elected. Winning an election depends on 
resources spent on the campaign and the senator’s performance in Congress. When 
voting on a particular bill, a senator considers the trade-off between the costs and the 
benefits of voting pro-AMA. The costs include losing support from opposing interest 
groups and possibly losing constituency support. The benefits of voting pro-AMA are 
contributions provided by the AMA and time and effort spent by AMA members in the 
candidate’s behalf. The marginal gain for voting pro-AMA must at least equal the 
marginal cost. AMA contributions (AMA$) and the percent of the physician population 
represented by the AMA (%AMA) are the main interest group variables of concern in 
this model. We hypothesize that AMA contributions, and the percent AMA physician 
population, positively influence senators’ votes.
The market for legislation is competitive; interest groups compete for political 
favors. Interest groups who support or oppose particular bills pressure senators to vote 
in their favor. For each vote equation, we try to identify other interest groups 
associated with the bill (groups either opposed to the AMA stance or supportive of the 
AMA stance). OTHGRPS is the contributions of other interest groups who support or 
oppose the bill up for vote. We specify whether the group is expected to have a 
positive effect (if they are in agreement with the AMA) or a negative effect (those 
opposed the AMA stance). The AMA is likely to be more "successful" when another
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interest group joins them in supporting a particular bill, whereas strong opposition from 
another group lessens the probability of a senator voting pro-AMA. To capture any 
synergistic effects between the AMA and other interest groups, we include an 
interactive variable, SYNERGY=AMA$ X OTHGRPS.
Kau, Keenan, and Rubin (1982) suggest the need to consider grudge-bearing on 
the part of a senator when it comes time to vote on a particular bill. If the AMA 
contributes substantially to a senator’s opponent, does that senator "punish" the AMA 
by voting against the AMA stance? To examine this issue, we include AMA 
contributions made to a senator’s opponent or contributions made specifically to oppose 




We include the percent of the total vote received by the senator in the last 
election (VOTE MARGIN) as a measure of the "safety margin" a senator feels when 
voting on a particular bill of interest to the AMA. With a relatively high electoral 
margin, the senator may feel safe when voting in compliance with interest groups, 
independent of constituency preferences. In this case, we expect a positive relationship 
between VOTE MARGIN and VOTE. Alternatively, a high electoral margin may 
simply represent a strong correlation between senator and constituency ideology. For 
these reasons, the sign of VOTE MARGIN is ambiguous.
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A senator’s propensity to vote pro-AMA depends on her personal characteristics. 
Ideology is significant explaining legislator behavior in other studies.1 To capture the 
effects of ideology, political affiliation and rating by the Americans for Democratic 
Action (ADA) are included. PARTY equals 1 if the senator is a Republican, 0 if a 
Democrat. ADA rating (ADA) is based on liberal/conservative voting behavior defined 
by the Americans for Democratic Action, with higher scores reflecting more liberal 
voting patterns. We use the party and ADA rating variables to control for a senator's 
inherent taste for legislation, independent of interest group or constituent pressure. 
Unlike PARTY, ADA varies significantly over time for an individual senator.
We include the number of years a senator has been in the Senate (TENURE) 
to capture a senator’s feeling of "job security". Tenure may provide a sense of 
independence in that the senator feels unconstrained by constituency pressure and can 
safely support AMA interests. It also provides an advantage in attracting campaign 
funds, thus a lower demand for AMA contributions specifically and less pressure to 
vote pro-AMA. Because of these conflicting effects, we do not predict the sign of the 
effect of tenure on votes.
1.2.2.2 Constituent Characteristics
Constituent characteristics may also influence senators’ voting. Kau. Keenan, 
and Rubin (1982) argue that constituent ideology can be used to proxy senator ideology, 
since candidates with ideologies different from those of their constituencies would not
1 Chappell (1982), Mueller (1986), Keenan, Kau, and Rubin (1982), Feldstein and 
Melnick (1982), Neustadtl (1990), Davis (1993), Peltzman (1984), and Keiser and Jones 
(1986).
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be elected. But, assuming at least partial voter ignorance, and given the possibility of 
ticket-splitting (voters elect one Democrat and one Republican) the relationship between 
constituent ideology and senator ideology may not necessarily hold. Therefore, we 
assume constituents are "demanders" of legislation and a senator’s ideology may be 
different from her constituency’s ideology. Since senators want to be reelected, 
constituent preferences will matter to senators and are included in the vote equation.2
Several demographic variables are used to reflect constituents’ tastes for 
legislation. The percent of the state’s population that is over sixty-five years of age 
(%ELDERLY) captures elder citizens’ preferences for certain types of health 
legislation. The sign of its coefficient depends on the particular issue up for vote.
Phelps (1992) hypothesizes that per capita income (INCOME) is related to the 
demand for certain types of health legislation. People with higher incomes may be 
more efficient in the production of health. This "health spa effect" may cause high 
income voters to oppose certain health bills. On the other hand, higher incomes offer 
the opportunity for more unhealthy lifestyles and these "fast lane effects" may actually 
create higher demand for certain types of health reform. INCOME is a taste control 
variable.
To control for any possible regional differences in tastes, dummy variables for 
South, East, and Midwest are included. West is the omitted region of comparison.
2 This assumption is consistent with senators not engaging in complete shirking.
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1.3 AMA Behavior
No specific underlying "utility" function is specified for the AMA. Developing 
a theory of a group utility function is beyond the scope of this study. Olsen (1971) 
suggests the purpose of an organization such as a PAC is "the furtherance of the 
interests of (its) members". Furthermore, a group utility function does not logically 
follow from the maximization of individual members’ utility functions, since purely 
individual interests are better advanced individually. Those in control of an 
organization may shirk and use their power to maximize their own welfare, which may 
or may not coincide with group interests. Max Weber (1947) proposes that a group 
may exist for the purpose of "serving only the ends of the leadership". Our analysis 
allows for this possibility. The AMA’s revealed preferences are taken from the AMA’s 
Compendium o f Statements, whenever possible.3 The "revealed preference" is 
assumed to reflect the AMA's interests, whether it be the group’s common interests or 
the leadership's interests, and is consistent with maximizing behavior.
We use Tobit analysis because the AMA contributes to some senators but not 
to others. Even when contributions are zero, there may still be some underlying, latent 
willingness to contribute but we do not observe this willingness, and the data are said 
to be censored. Applying least squares procedures to either a subsample of 
observations where contributions are positive, or to the full set of observations leads 
to inconsistent and biased estimators.4
3 Votes dealing with issues mentioned in the Compendium are used, as are any 
votes on issues clearly of concern to the AMA.
4 See Judge et al, (1988) Chapter 19.
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To develop the Tobit framework, we assume that the AMA perceives each 
senator as having some threshold contribution level before she will vote as the AMA 
desires. This "supply price" may be different across senators. The AMA attempts to 
distribute its (limited) funds efficiently, and contributes to senators having the lowest 
"supply price" first. At some point, the contribution level will reach the AMA's 
"reservation price", the maximum amount the AMA is willing to contribute to a 
particular senator.5 If the AMA’s "reservation" level of contributions is less than the 
perceived supply price, the AMA will not contribute to this senator. Although the 
AMA might be willing to contribute some amount to this senator, we do not observe 
this willingness.6 Consider the following variables.
AMASj* = contributions the AMA is willing to contribute to senator i 
AMASj = the AMA’s actual (observed) contributions to senator i 
AMASj0 = senator i’s (perceived) supply price for voting pro-AMA 
If AMASj* >  AMASj0 then AMAS; = AMASj* 7 
If AMASj* ( AMASj0 then AMASj = 0
5 The AMA’s "reservation" price would be that level of contributions at which the 
marginal gains just equal the marginal costs of making that contribution. Given that 
funds available to the AMA for contribution are limited, it would not make sense for 
the AMA to contribute $10,000 to Senator X in order to buy his vote if it could 
contribute $5,000 each to Senators Y and Z in order to buy two votes.
6 The constrained optimization assumption is not empirically modeled in this Tobit 
framework due to the difficulties created by using a casual structural model to justify 
what is essentially a reduced-form empirical equation.
7 Rational behavior would imply that the AMA adjusts the maximum amount they 
would be willing to contribute to a particular senator until it just equals AMASj0 since 
it would not contribute more than necessary to obtain votes. In that case, the 
formulation would be: If AMASj* =  AMASj0, then AMASj =  AMASj*.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
2 4
The equation of interest is 
AMA$ =  X’j3c+e
where X is a matrix of determinants of contributions and (3C is the vector of 
corresponding unknown parameters. The equation to be estimated is
The factors assumed to affect the level of contributions are the percentage of 
times the senator votes pro-AMA (VOTE INDEX), PARTY, whether the senator is 
facing an upcoming election (CAMPGN), whether the senator was an incumbent in the 
last election (INCUMBENT), the contributions received by the senator’s opponent 
(TOTALOPPS), ADA, SOUTH, EAST, MIDWEST, and if the senator serves on one 
of the following Senate committees; Budget, Finance, Foreign Relations, Governmental 
Affairs, and Small Business (BUDGET, FINANCE. FOREIGN RELATIONS. GOVT 
AFFAIRS, and SMALL BUSINESS).
1.3.1 Vote Index
The vote index, (VOTE INDEX), is included in the contributions equation 
instead of the individual vote variable VOTE. VOTE INDEX is the ratio of pro-AMA 
votes to total votes during a voting cycle.8 To allow for different effects based on 
issue specificity, we estimate the contributions equation using three measures of the 
vote index; the full sample of forty-two votes for the full vote index and a narrow vote
' AMAS = X’/3c+e if AMAS >: AMA® 
AMA$: = 0 otherwise ( 1 .2 )
VOTE INDEX =52
VOTE
where N is the total number of votes
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index and a broad vote index, each consisting of twenty-one votes. For example, we 
code H J Res 631 (1982) and S 655 (1986) as narrow: H J Res 631 bars the use of 
Federal Trade Commission funds to investigate or make rules relating to the medical 
profession and S 655 reduces the limits on political action committee contributions. 
Examples of broad votes are HR 4616 and S 1630 (1990); HR 4616 withholds federal 
highway funds from states whose minimum drinking ages are under twenty-one and S 
1630 (passage of the Clean Air Act Reauthorization) provides for the attainment and 
maintenance of health ambient air quality standards.
1.3.2 Control Variables
1.3.2.1 Senator Characteristics
In each of the contribution cycles studied, AMP AC has contributed more to 
Republican senators than Democratic senators. If the AMA opposes increased 
government regulation, and Democrats are generally viewed as pro-government 
involvement, we expect a positive relationship between AMAS and PARTY (PARTY = 1 
if Republican, 0 if Democrat).
AMA contributions are affected by the senator’s demand for campaign funds. 
A senator’s demand for contributions is greater when facing an upcoming election. 
Therefore, we expect a positive relationship between AMAS and CAMPGN, a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if the senator is facing an upcoming election. Interest groups prefer 
to contribute to the frontrunner in order to insure access after the election.9 Since
9 Access may then be translated into influence on votes. This matter will be 
discussed in detail later.
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incumbents traditionally are re-elected, we would expect a positive relationship between 
AMAS and the incumbent variable (INCUMBENT =1 if the senator is an incumbent). 
It could be, however, that incumbents require less overall contributions. If so. 
incumbents may demand less contributions from the AMA. Therefore, we do not 
predict the direction of effect for INCUMBENT a priori.
Incumbents seek more contributions in close elections and interest groups are 
willing to supply funds to sympathetic candidates in such elections. We hypothesize 
that AMA contributions are positively related to the total campaign contributions 
received by a candidate’s opponent during an election cycle (TOTALOPPS), which is 
used as a proxy for the closeness of a race.
ADA is included as an explanatory variable to capture senator ideology. More 
conservative senators, as reflected by a lower ADA score, have ideologies more 
compatible with those of the AMA. and might receive more support, an assumption 
supported by AMP AC’s declared goal of creating a conservative coalition in Congress. 
We include the previously defined regional dummies to capture regional differences in 
the demand for campaign funds.
Bills brought to a vote on the Senate floor must have passed through committee. 
Committee assignments should be an important factor in determining targets for AMA 
contributions.10 Five Senate committees control most bills concerning the health 
industry. Assignment to the Budget, the Finance. Foreign Relations. Governmental
10 Committees have power over whether a bill is reported to the full Senate for a 
vote, and over the content of the bill. We address the issue of committee importance 
in Chapter 4.
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Affairs, and the Small Business Committees are controlled for through the dummy 
variables BUDGET. FINANCE, FOREIGN RELATIONS, GOV’T AFFAIRS, and 
SMALL BUSINESS.
1.3.2.2 Constituency Characteristics
Previous studies of interest group effects include certain constituency 
characteristics in the contributions equation, arguing a PAC will not "waste" dollars on 
senators with constituencies firmly opposed to the interest group. For example, labor 
union PACs potentially find it unprofitable to contribute to senators from states that are 
highly anti-union. The marginal dollar spent on these senators has little or no effect. 
But given the diversity of bills in this study, there is no one constituency group that 
would consistently oppose the AMA. In addition, the specification of AMAS above 
incorporates this marginal decision-making.
This model assumes AMA contributions are independent of any constituency 
variables. While the AMA might assume rational ignorance on the pan of voters, this 
is not necessary for the validity of the above assumption. Constituency voting may be 
influenced by total campaign spending, but not by AMA spending. Hence, the AMA 
may not consider voter behavior important when choosing its optimal level of 
contributions.11
11 The relationship between AMA contributions, as “seed money”, and total 
contributions received is not addressed here.
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1.4 Constituency Behavior
Development of a comprehensive model of constituent voting is beyond the 
scope of this paper. Instead, we present a simple model of consistent voting which 
takes the following form:
VOTE MARGIN; = Xf'Q? +  e;P (1.3)
= a + d ^ O T E  INDEX; +  do LAGGED VOTE MARGIN;
+  d3TOTALOPP$; +d4INCUMBENT;+d5 % WHITE;
+ d6% ELDERLY;+d7INCOME;+e;
Total voter ignorance is not assumed; we assume voters observe (and care 
about) the way their senators vote on particular bills. Thus, a senator’s record affects 
the probability of re-election. The sign of the VOTE INDEX coefficient is not 
predicted, as voters may support some bills included in the vote index and oppose 
others.
Voters are assumed to be consistent, in that, if all else remains the same, the 
way they voted in the last election is the way they vote in the current election. We use 
the margin received by the winner in the election prior to the last one (LAGGED 
VOTE MARGIN) to capture the consistency of voting behavior.
Jacobson (1980) finds a negative relationship between a candidate’s total 
campaign spending and the margin by which he wins an election. While this may seem 
a peculiar result, higher campaign spending may capture the effects of a close race, and 
facing a strong opponent at the polls reduces the winner’s electoral margin. Instead of 
using total campaign receipts of the winner, we use the opponent’s campaign
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receipts(TOTALOPPS) to measure the closeness of a race. TOTALOPPS is expected 
to reduce VOTE MARGIN, a result which is consistent with Jacobson’s analysis.12
Voters typically re-elect incumbents running for office. Incumbents use 
constituent mailings to enhance their image and they have a comparative advantage in 
raising campaign dollars. Given the complexity of the political election process, voters 
cannot incorporate all the available information on candidates in their decision-making 
process. Carmines and Kuklinski (1990) argue that voters use heuristics, or short-cuts, 
to gather and use political information. Political signals play a significant role in 
citizen decision-making, and reputation serves as a signal. Incumbency creates 
reputation; the longer a senator serves, the clearer her positions become to the public. 
INCUMBENCY is included to reflect voters’ somewhat heuristic decision-making 
process.
We use constituency characteristics to control for voters’ preferences in 
elections. % ELDERLY, and INCOME were defined earlier and are used to reflect 
voters' tastes in elections. The percentage of the state population that is white is also 
included {%WHITE).
1.5 Model Estimation
Given the joint determination of VOTE, AMAS. and VOTE MARGIN, two- 
stage estimation techniques are used. The three equations derived in the previous 
section are denoted as
12 Using a fixed effects model. Levitt (1984) finds campaign spending has a much 
smaller effect on electoral votes than found in Jacobson’s cross-sectional model.
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VOTE; = f1[Xiv,^v 4- ev]
AMASj =  f2[XjC’/Sc + ec]
VOTE MARGIN; = f3[XiP,JSP 4- eP]
(1.4)
(1.5)
( 1 .6 )
AMAS and VOTE MARGIN appear as explanatory variables in the VOTE 
equation. VOTE appears in the AMAS and the VOTE MARGIN equations.13 The 
design matrix in each equation is correlated to the error term of that equation and single 
equation estimation is not appropriate. Therefore, we estimate the equations using two- 
stage techniques. In the first stage, instrumental variables are created which are 
correlated with the design matrix but not with the error term. The instrumental 
variables are the predicted (endogenous) variables, estimated by using all exogenous and 
lagged endogenous explanatory variables in the system. The instrumental variables 
replace the right-hand side endogenous variables in the second stage with their predicted 
values.
If X is the matrix of variables including all of the unique elements of XjV. X;c. 
and XjP, that is, all exogenous and lagged endogenous variables included in the system, 
the reduced form equations to be estimated in the first stage are
VOTE; = f[X7Tj + V j ]
AMAS; = g[X7TT 4- v7]
VOTE MARGIN; = h[Xr3 +  v3]
In the first stage of estimation, the vote equations are estimated by Probit. the 
contributions equation by Tobit, and the vote margin equation by ordinary least squares.
13 VOTE appears in the equations through the vote index variable, VOTE INDEX.
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In the second stage, the predicted values obtained in the first stage replace the right- 
hand side endogenous variables.14
The covariance matrix of the system of equations is a complex function of all 
of the error terms in the first-stage and second-stage equations (the e’s and v's). 
Bootstrapping is a resampling procedure that permits estimation of standard errors using 
the observed residuals. Freedman and Peters (1984) show that the conventional 
estimates of standard errors using two-stage estimation can underestimate the actual 
standard errors.15 Bootstrapping produces more reliable estimates of the standard 
errors for hypothesis testing, without relying on asymptotic assumptions.16 One 
thousand pseudo-data sets17 containing seven hundred observations each are formed 
by randomly sampling (with replacement) from the original data set. The equations are 
estimated using the pseudo-data sets. The bootstrap standard error is the standard 
deviation of the sample of estimated coefficients from this bootstrap procedure. We are 
concerned with hypothesis testing for the significance of explanatory variables and 
believe using bootstrap standard errors is superior to using conventional standard errors. 
Bootstrap estimates of coefficient bias, standard deviation of bias, and bias t-statistics 
are fully reported in Appendix D.
14 In addition to estimating the individual vote equations, we estimate the vote 
indices using the same design matrix used for the individual vote equations. 
Generalized least square estimation is used for the vote indices equations.
15 Freedman and Peters (1984) provide a review of the literature on bootstrap 
results.
16 Freedman and Peters (1984) note that asymptotics are less reliable the more 
covariances there are to estimate.
17 The bootstrap procedure was also performed using five hundred pseudo-data sets 
for comparison.
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1.6 Data
All data are from 1978 through 1992. Contributions and Senate voting are in 
corresponding two year cycles. All monetary values are adjusted to real terms. See 
Appendix A for variable descriptive statistics.
We obtain data on campaign contributions from the Federal Election 
Commission’s Reports on Financial Activity and Committee Index o f Candidates 
Supported/Opposed. The former provides data on total contributions received by 
senators and their opponents, while the latter reports AMP AC contributions.
Each year, the AMA issues a Compendium o f Statements to the Congress and 
the administrative agencies, through its Department of Federal Legislation. These 
statements on legislative and regulatory issues are used to identify bills of interest to 
the AMA. Additional bills having a clear impact on the AMA or its members are 
included, even if they are excluded from the Compendium. We identify forty-two bills 
that the AMA clearly supports or opposes.18 Roll call votes obtained from the 
Congressional Quarterly’s Congressional Roll Call are set equal to one if the vote is 
consistent with the AMA’s position, and set to zero otherwise. Missing values are 
replaced by predicted values. Each vote equation, therefore, has one hundred 
observations. For each bill possible, we identify other interest groups as either 
opposing or supporting the AMA. Contributions from these other groups are used. See 
Appendix F for a list of the PACs associated with these interest groups.
18 Several votes that were identified as being important to the AMA lacked 
sufficient variation. These votes could not be used in the study.
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Data on senators’ characteristics and electoral margins are obtained from the 
Congressional Quarterly Almanac, the Congressional Quarterly’s Congressional Roll 
Call, and from the Census Bureau. The Census Bureau’s Statistical Abstract provides 
data on constituency characteristics and physician populations.
1.7 Results
The primary focus of this study is to determine what, if any, effect AMP AC 
contributions have on Senate roll call votes. We are also interested in any effects that 
voting behavior has on AMP AC contributions. The results from the individual vote 
equations are presented first, followed by the vote indices equations. Next, the 
contributions equations results are presented. Lastly, results from the vote margin 
equation are reported. Lists of the dependent and independent variables for the 
appropriate equations are presented where necessary.
1.7.1 Vote Equation Results 
Dependent Variable
VOTE = 1 if pro-AMA vote, 0 if against the AMA’s stance 
Independent Variables
Interest Group Variables
AMAS = contributions from AMP AC
%AMA =  percent of the state’s doctor population that are AMA members 
OTHGRPS = contributions from an interest group other than AMP AC 
SYNERGY = interaction term between AMAS and OTHGRPS 
AMAOPPS = contributions from AMP AC to the senator’s opponent in the last 
election
Control Variables (Senator Characteristics and Constituency Characteristics) 
VOTE MARGIN = electoral margin received by the senator in the last election
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PARTY = 1 if Republican, 0 if Democrat
ADA =  Americans for Democratic Action rating (liberal to conservative rating) 
TENURE =  number of years that the senator has been in the U.S. Senate 
% ELDERLY =  percent of the state’s population that is over 65 years old 
INCOME = state’s real per capita income 
EAST, SOUTH, MIDWEST = regional dummies
1.7.1.1 Individual Vote Equations
Table 1.1 is a summary of the forty-two individual vote equations. The full 
regression results for each equation are provided in Appendix C. The hypothesized 
direction of effect is in parentheses. Variables whose signs are predicted a priori are 
tested using a one-tailed test, while those whose sign is not predicted are tested using 
a two-tailed test. A discussion of the major results follows.
1.7.1.1.1 Interest Group Variables
Of the forty-two votes analyzed, AMAS is significant in only two. The two 
votes on which contributions have effects are a motion to kill an amendment to the 
fiscal 1988 budget (1987 S Con Res 49) and a motion to invoke cloture, thus limiting 
debate on a bill to amend the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (1990 S 341). It should be 
noted that a preferred amendment may be introduced later to substitute for the one 
killed on the floor, and it is difficult to ascertain why a motion to invoke cloture is 
made at a particular time. It could be made in hopes of passing the bill or killing the 
bill at that time. Given the uncertain purpose of these votes, the codings, and therefore 
results, are questionable. The overall results provide little evidence that the AMA is 
successful in capturing individual votes of interest. %AMA is significant and positive
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Table 1.1
Individual Vote Equations (Pro-AMA V ote= l) 







AMAS (+ ) 2 2 0
%AMA (+ ) 3 3 0
OTHGRPS (?) 1 1 0
SYNERGY (?) 0 0 0
AMAOPPS (-) 0 0 0
Control Variables
VOTE MARGIN (?) 1 1 0
PARTY (?) 9 4 5
ADA (?) 23 11 12
TENURE (?) 5 4 1
% ELDERLY (?) 2 2 0
INCOME (?) 12 7 5
EAST (?) 4 3 1
SOUTH (?) 6 3 3
MIDWEST (?) 2 0 2
CONSTANT 10 3 7
3 Significant at the .05 level
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in only three of the votes. Mueller (1986) argues lobbying strength is more important 
than contributions in determining some votes. The significance of % AMA is consistent 
with that argument. But, as with contributions, the number of votes affected is small 
given the total number of votes studied.
The other interest group variable (OTHGRPS) is significant in only one vote 
equation. The vote was on an amendment to eliminate the five-month waiting period 
for disability insurance benefits for persons with diseases that two doctors determined 
would lead to death within 12 months, a bill that the AMA opposed. While the AMA’s 
position is clearly stated in the Compendium, the insurance companies' position is not 
clear. A one-tailed test of significance shows insurance PAC money has a negative 
effect on this particular vote, but to accept this result, one would have to assume 
insurance PACs support the bill. A two-tailed test fails to show significance.
No synergistic effects between the AMA and other interest groups are detected 
in any of the votes. There is also no evidence that grudge-bearing is occurring. AMA 
contributions made to a senator’s opponent do not effect her roll call vote.
1.7.1.1.2 Control Variables
Ideology, as measured by ADA rating and PARTY, seems to be the most 
important determinant of voting behavior, a result found by numerous other studies. 
Given the perception that Democrats favor government intervention and are “pro- 
choice". the signs on ADA and PARTY are as expected. The signs on ADA and 
PARTY are vote specific and for votes where they both appear as significant, they are 
of opposite sign, except for HR 2622 in 1991.
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There is very little evidence that AMP AC contributions affect individual votes. 
Individual votes may not capture the multidimensional concerns of the AMA. 
Therefore, in the following section, we examine vote indices to determine if the AMA 
is successful in affecting votes over a range of issues.
1.7.1.2 Vote Indices Equations Results
The forty-two votes are used to create the full vote index. The votes are then 
separated according to specificity to the AMA. The narrow vote index contains twenty- 
one votes which directly affect AMA members or AMP AC. The broad vote index 
contains twenty-one votes which have broader social impact. The results reported in 
Table 1.2 are based on these different samples of votes. The data have been corrected 
for heteroskedasticity.19 The equations are estimated by generalized least squares. 
The predicted direction of effect is below the variable name. Since other interest 
groups were identified vote by vote in the individual vote equations, the variables 
OTHGRPS and SYNERGY cannot be aggregated for use in the indices equations. The 
t-statistics are absolute values.
1.7.1.2.1 Full Vote Index
1.7.1.2.1.1 Interest Group Variables
Again, there is no evidence that the AMA is successful in capturing votes. 
None of the interest group variables of interest (AMAS, %AMA. and AMAOPPS) 
significantly affect the full vote index. We find no evidence to support the hypothesis
19 All data are transformed by P. where and var(VOTE INDEX) = [VOTE 
INDEX( 1-VOTE INDEX)]/N.
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Table 1.2 
Vote Indices Equations 
GLS Estimates and t-statistics




AMAS .0000012 .000001 -.000000121
(+ ) (.979) (.600) (.076)
%AMA .0104 .237* -.0775
(+ ) (.120) (1.993) (.690)
AMAOPPS .00000003 -.0000006 .0000007
(-) (.035) (.498) (.570)
Control Variables
VOTE MARGIN .08511 .207 -.0183
(?) (.931) (1.646) (.154)
PARTY -.04248 .0319 -.0442
(?) (1.519) (.829) (1.216)
ADA -.000162 -.00056 .00092
(?) (.357) (.899) (1.550)
TENURE .003385* .0025 .00295
(?) (2.67) (1.435) (1.790)
%ELDERLY 1.071* 1.899* .7618
(?) (2.392) (3.082) (1.308)
INCOME .0000107* .0000046 .0000199*
(?) (2.408) (.744) (3.440)
EAST -.00289 -.0426 .0146
(?) (.091) (.978) (.355)
SOUTH -.0366 -.1065* .0283
(?) (1.14) (2.423) (.681)
MIDWEST -.03998 -.1317* .0210
(?) (1.204) (2.882) (.486)
CONSTANT 1.3828 -.2913 1.8137
(6.761) (1.035) (6.819)
F-Value 7.310* 8.587* 7.050*
* Significant at the .05 level
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that the AMA affects votes, either through its contributions or its membership size. 
There is also no evidence that senators punish the AMA by voting against its stance. 
The grudge-bearing variable, AMAOPPS is statistically insignificant.
1.7.1.2.1.2 Control Variables
Ideology is insignificant in determining the vote indices, though it is significant 
in a majority of the individual vote equation. Given that the signs on PARTY and 
ADA on individual votes are almost equally split and that the full vote index contains 
both liberal and conservative, this result is not surprising. TENURE is significant and 
positive, supporting the hypothesis that longer tenure provides the senator with a sense 
of security when voting pro-AMA.20 % ELDERLY and INCOME are significant and 
positive, indicating that the preferences of the elderly and higher income constituencies 
are important to senators.
1.7.1.2.2 Narrow and Broad Vote Indices
One reason for the insignificance of the AMA interest group variables in the full 
vote index equation may be a heterogeneity problem in aggregating votes. To further 
test for effects on different types of votes, we divide the sample of votes into 
subsamples. Of the forty-two votes used in the study, twenty-one are defined as being 
of narrow interest to the AMA and twenty-one as being of broad interest. The narrow 
vote index contains key votes which are “weighted” more heavily by the AMA than
20 Recall that votes are coded 1 if voted in favor of the AMA stance and 0 
otherwise. The results for TENURE are not to be interpreted as interaction terms, 
since the AMA variables are not significant. Rather, they indicate increased 
independence from constituency pressures when voting pro-AMA.
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votes in the broad index. The broad index contains votes of a more social nature and 
do not necessarily directly impact AMA membership.21 We hypothesize that AMA 
influence is greater on votes of narrow interest, since these votes are more important 
to the AMA. The second and third columns of results in Table 1.2 show the results for 
the narrow vote index and the broad vote index.
1.7.1.2.2.1 Interest Group Variables
Even after segregating votes into two categories, there is no evidence that AMA 
contributions affect voting behavior. Vote buying is not occurring even for bills for 
which the AMA has strong preferences. To test even further for effects, the full 
sample of was divided into two time periods, 1978-1985 and 1986-1992.22 All three 
vote indices were analyzed. Chow tests (Chow, 1983) failed to reveal any structural 
shifts in the model.23
% AMA is significant in determining the narrow vote index and has the predicted 
sign, though it is insignificant in determining the broad (or full) index. State AMA 
membership is important to the senator on votes important to the AMA, while overall
21 If senators do respond to AMA variables, one would expect to find a larger 
effect on the narrow index since these votes matter more to the AMA and are, in 
general, less visible than the votes included in the broad index.
22 We divide the sample into two equal time periods to allow for any omitted 
factors that could cause differences in the periods. If significant differences were 
found, we could then further investigate by separating the sample at different time 
periods. Since no difference was found, we assume no underlying structural changes 
across time.
23 The Chow test statistics are .763, .927, and .415 for the full, narrow, broad 
indices, respectively. The critical value is 1.75.
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monetary contributions are not. AMA’s influence being greater on votes of narrow 
interest is consistent with interest group theory.
1.7.1.2.2.2 Control Variables
Senators consider constituency preferences and do not shirk completely. The 
elderly population and higher income population appear to have preferences compatible 
with the AMA and their preferences are taken into consideration by senators. This is 
consistent with elderly and higher income constituents being more politically active and 
vocal so that senators not only know their positions, but respond to them.
1.7.2 Contributions Equation Results 
Dependent Variable
AMA$ = contributions from AMP AC 
Independent Variables
VOTE INDEX = ratio of pro-AMA votes to total votes 
Control Variables
PARTY = 1 if Republican, 0 if Democrat
CAMPGN =  1 if senator is facing an upcoming election, 0 otherwise
INCUMBENCY = 1 if senator is an incumbent, 0 otherwise
TOTALOPPS = total campaign receipts of the senator’s opponent
ADA = Americans for Democratic Action rating (liberal to conservative rating)
EAST, SOUTH, MIDWEST = regional dummies
BUDGET = 1 if on the Budget Committee, 0 otherwise
FINANCE = 1 if on Finance Committee, 0 otherwise
FOREIGN RELATIONS = 1 if on Foreign Relations Committee, 0 otherwise
GOV’T AFFAIRS = 1 if on Governmental Affairs Committee, 0 otherwise
SMALL BUSINESS = 1 if on Small Business Committee, 0 otherwise
Another purpose of this study is to identify determinants of AMA contributions. 
We are particularly interested in the effects that senators’ voting behavior have on
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AMA contributions. Table 1.3 is a comparison of single equation and simultaneous 
equation Tobit estimations of AMA contributions. The two-stage results show both the 
t-statistic from two-stage estimation and the t-statistic using the bootstrap standard 
errors.24 The equation is estimated three times. The first two columns of results 
are from using the full vote index as an explanatory variable, the third and fourth 
columns from using the narrow index, and the last two columns from using the broad 
index.
1.7.2.1 Vote Indices
None of the vote indices significantly affect contribution behavior. Results from 
the previous section show no evidence that the AMA is successful in buying votes, and 
results from the contributions equations suggest vote-buying is not even a motive of the 
AMA. This is consistent with the hypothesis that the AMA’s motive for contributing 
is to gain access or goodwill,25 not to reward or punish senators for voting behavior.
Political scientists contend that access is an important motivation for campaign 
contributions and that access is a necessary, though not sufficient, condition for 
influence.26 PAC money itself carries no message to congressmen. Access or some 
other form of communication is needed to translate money into influence. Investments
24 The bootstrap standard error is calculated as the standard deviation of the sample 
of five hundred estimates obtained from Tobit estimation of the five hundred “pseudo- 
datasets See Hill, Cartwright and Arbaugh (1994) page 11.
25 Sabato (1984, pp. 128-132) lists four types of PAC contributions; “reward 
money” , “punish money” , “present needs” money, and “future needs” or “goodwill” 
money.
26 Langbein (1986), Grenzke (1989), Gopoian (1984), Malbin (1984), Sabato 
(1984). Sorauf (1988).
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Table 1.3 
Tobit Results of AMA Contributions 
Single Equation and Simultaneous Equation Estimates and t-Statisticsa
Full Vote Index Narrow Vote Index Broad Vote Index












































































































Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
4 4
Full Vote Index Narrow Vote Index Broad Vote Index





























































































































a Significance is not denoted due to the reporting of both the t-statistics from 
standard analysis and from bootstrapping.
b t-statistic using Bootstrap standard error
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made by PACs open doors so that the PACs have a chance to tell their story. In an 
empirical analysis of contributions and a direct measure of access. Langbein (1986)finds 
that PAC contributions buy access time at a decreasing rate. The results found here 
dispute the vote-buying motive and are consistent with access-buying. While access and 
vote-buying are not the same, the relationship between contributions, access, and 
influence has not been established and warrants further research.
1.7.2.2 Control Variables
Some variables are significant and have their predicted signs. Senators facing 
an upcoming election receive more contributions, perhaps due to increased solicitation 
or because the AMA wants sympathetic senators re-elected. Republicans receive more 
money from the AMA than Democrats, a finding consistent with the AMA’s desire for 
a conservative coalition. The insignificance of the ADA variable, in conjunction with 
the significance of PARTY indicates that the AMA considers party affiliation a better 
indication of ideology and contributes accordingly. The negative sign on the 
incumbency coefficient is consistent with the argument that incumbents are more 
efficient in raising overall contributions and therefore demand less funds specifically 
from the AMA. The higher the level of campaign funds a senator’s opponent has, the 
higher are AMA contributions, perhaps because of the senator’s greater demand for 
political contributions.
Membership on the Senate Finance Committee is important in determining 
contribution levels, but assignment to the other committees does not appear to affect 
contributions. This suggests that Finance Committee activity is important to the AMA
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relative to floor action. Chapter 4 of this study further investigates the relationship 
between contributions and committee action.
Variables that emerge as significant determinants of AMA contributing behavior 
do not vary in terms of their significance across indices.27 This, again, supports the 
theory that the AMA is contributing for reasons other than buying votes, whether the 
votes are of narrow concern or of broad concern.
1.7.3 Vote Margin Equation Results
The primary concerns of this study are the effects of AMA contributions on 
Senate roll call votes and the effects of votes on contributions. In order to complete 
the model and obtain unbiased estimates in the other equations, we include the vote 
margin equation in the system of equations to allow for the endogeneity of constituent 
voting behavior. The dependent and independent variables are listed below. 
Dependent Variable
VOTE MARGIN = electoral margin received by the senator in the last election 
Independent Variables
VOTE INDEX = ratio of pro-AMA votes to total votes 
Control Variables
LAGGED VOTE MARGIN = lagged electoral margin received by the senator 
TOTALOPPS = total campaign receipts of the senator’s opponent 
INCUMBENCY = I if senator is an incumbent, 0 otherwise 
% WHITE = percent of the state population that is white 
% ELDERLY =  percent of the state population over 65 years old 
INCOME = state’s per capita income
27 The reported Tobit estimates are estimates of the marginal effects on the latent 
variable (the underlying willingness to contribute), and indicate the direction of effect 
on the observed variable (actual AMA contributions).
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Table 1.4 presents the results from single equation and simultaneous estimation 
techniques. The t-statistics from two-stage ieast squares and from bootstrapping are 
reported. Data are corrected for heteroskedasticity.
1.7.3.1 Standard Analysis Results
The following conclusions are based on the two-stage least squares t-statistics. 
The voting behavior of senators is not significant in determining election outcomes (at 
least over the votes studied). This result is consistent with the rationally ignorant voter 
hypothesis.
Higher opponent’s receipts are an indication of a close race and the results are 
consistent with Jacobson’s result. Jacobson finds a significant negative relationship 
between a candidate’s campaign spending and her electoral margin. He concludes that 
higher campaign spending indicates a tight race. We use the opponent’s total campaign 
receipts instead of the senator’s total receipts, but the conclusion is the same as 
Jacobson’s.
Incumbency leads to higher electoral margins. Voters behave consistently; they 
tend to vote the way they have in the past. Higher white populations and higher income 
populations lead to closer electoral outcomes.
1.7.3.2 Bootstrap Results
The t-statistics using the bootstrap standard errors produce somewhat different 
conclusions. None of the variables included in the equation explain constituency voting 
when the bootstrap t-statistics are used for hypothesis testing. The bootstrap estimates 
of the standard errors are larger than the two-stage estimates, indicating that the least
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Table 1.4
Least Squares Results of VOTE MARGIN Equation 
Single Equation and Two-Stage Least Squares Estimates and t-Statisticsa
Single Equation OLS Two-Stage Least Squares










LAGGED VOTE .079255 .079921
MARGIN (19.415) (19.4)
(1.557)












a Significance is not denoted due to the reporting of both the t-statistics from 
standard analysis and from bootstrapping.
b t-Statistic using Bootstrap standard error.
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squares modeling of this equation may not be the correct specification. However, 
constructing a comprehensive model of voter behavior is not the purpose of this study. 
1.8 Conclusions
The capture theory of legislation holds that interest groups contribute money in 
order to affect legislation in their favor. This chapter looks specifically at contributions 
made by the American Medical Political Action Committee and U.S. Senate roll call 
votes on bills of interest to the AMA, with traditional assumptions about the timing of 
the responses. There is no evidence that the AMA is successful in capturing regulation 
by affecting roll call votes. Even votes on issues of differing specificity do not respond 
to AMA contributions.
When we separate votes according to specificity into narrow and broad 
categories, the percent of physicians in a state who are members of the AMA positively 
affects the narrow vote index. This is consistent with Mueller’s (1986) findings. While 
PAC “influence” has never been clearly defined, our findings suggest that AMA 
membership (and the potential lobbying efforts it represents) is more important in 
determining roll call votes than AMA contributions.
We do not propose that the results found for the AMA apply to other interest 
groups since the purpose of interest groups may vary from industry to industry. But 
when we compare our results to those of previous studies using multiple equation 
models, our individual roll call vote results are consistent with others’ findings. 
Chappell (1982), Stratmann (1991), and Kau et al. (1982) find little evidence that
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contributions significantly affect votes. The studies using vote indices find more 
significant contributions effects, but none of those studies look at the AMA specifically.
We find no evidence that senators’ voting behavior influences AMA 
contributions. Ideology, election cycle, incumbency, and campaign spending by a 
senator’s opponent are significant determinants of AMA contributions. Senate Finance 
Committee members receive significantly higher AMA contributions.
The simultaneous model used in this chapter represents a more comprehensive 
model of senator and interest group behavior, yet we find no evidence of AMA 
influence through contributions. The lack of significant findings is rather surprising. 
The AMA spends millions of dollars every campaign cycle and we assume that the 
AMA is rational in its contributing behavior. The assumptions we make concerning 
model specification may be driving the results. For example, we assume lagged 
contributions affect current voting, but we do not consider the effects of current 
contributions. We assume the underlying relationship between votes and contributions 
is the same for senators facing an upcoming election and those who are not. We make 
the same assumption for Senate committee members and non-members. In the next 
three chapters, we relax these assumptions in hopes of revealing the role of AMA 
contributions in the Senate.
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CHAPTER 2
THE TIMING OF VOTES AND CONTRIBUTIONS: IN SEARCH OF 
THE CONTRACT BETWEEN SENATORS AND THE AMERICAN 
MEDICAL POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEE
2.1 Introduction
The current debate over campaign reform is based on the popular belief that 
PACs exert influence in the political arena either by affecting election outcomes or by 
affecting the roll call votes by congressmen. In the search for the effects of PAC 
contributions on legislation, theoretical models that use roll call vote analyses 
traditionally assume congressmen reward PACs by voting favorably on bills of interest 
to the PACs. Empirically, current roll call votes are regressed on lagged contributions. 
While it may be a plausible assumption, the hypothesis of this timing scheme being the 
correct model needs to be tested, not simply assumed.
Contributions data typically used are reported by the Federal Elections 
Commission in two-year contribution cycles. Congressional Quarterly reports the 
specific day that individual votes occur. Because of these data inconsistencies, it is 
impossible to determine the precise timing of contributions and key votes. Perhaps this 
explains why traditional models use lagged contributions to explain current voting 
behavior. But if congressmen are concerned with current (or future) contributions, the 
model used to explain voting contributing behavior should be designed accordingly. It 
is possible to model the exchange of votes and contributions based on different timing 
mechanisms. Several alternative models of congressional voting behavior and PAC 
contribution behavior are possible: PACs may reward past voting behavior, contribute
51
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contemporaneously in exchange for votes, similar to the exchange of goods and money 
in private markets, or "invest” in future voting behavior. Assuming that the nature of 
the contract between PACs and congressmen is symmetric and known to both parties, 
congressmen vote in expectation of future contributions, respond to contributions in the 
current voting cycle, or "pay-off’ past contribution behavior. To develop a 
comprehensive model of PAC influence, these alternative possibilities must be addressed.
In this chapter, we develop a more comprehensive model of legislator and PAC 
behavior by allowing for these possibilities. Thus far. the results from research have 
been inconclusive concerning the effects of contributions on votes. Chapter 1 of this 
study uses the traditional timing of votes and contributions and finds no evidence that 
the AMA is successful in capturing legislation through vote-buying. In this chapter, we 
attempt to identify the relationship between senators' roll call votes on bills of interest 
to the AMA and contributions by the American Medical Political Action Committee 
(AMPAC) by analyzing models of alternative timing mechanisms. The alternative 
models are used to test the main hypothesis of this study: that AMA contributions affect 
legislative outcomes. Detailed development of the equations, general model, and 
estimation techniques are presented in Chapter 1.
2.2 Previous Studies’ Treatment of the Timing of the Contract
Existing studies assume a particular timing of contributions and voting: most 
often, they assume that contributions received in the period prior to voting in Congress 
influence roll call votes and that contributions are made based on the current voting 
behavior. Several studies use this ad hoc model specification. Chappell (1982). Kau.
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Keenan, and Ruben (1982). Feldstein (1984). Keiser and Jones (1986). Wilhite (1988). 
Stratmann (1991). and Davis (1993) all adopt this specification, and obtain mixed 
results. Langbein (1986) uses the same timing scheme in modeling contributions and 
access, as opposed to contributions and votes.
Other studies use different timing specifications to analyze the relationship 
between votes and contributions. Wilhite and Theilmann (1987) use a weighted average 
of AFL-CIO ratings to create a 1980 rank and a 1982 rank of favorable voting behavior. 
Assuming that the AFL-CIO ratings are from the same two-year cycle as contributions, 
the 1980 rank is based on votes in 1979-80 and the 1982 rank is based on 1981-82 
votes.1 Contributions are from these same periods, so a model of contemporaneous 
contributing/voting is estimated. Under this specification. PAC money significantly 
affects voting behavior and votes significantly affect contributions.
Mueller (1986) presents a unique model of the timing of contributions and votes. 
He uses contributions from 1972 to explain votes in 1973. 1974. 1975. and 1978. 
constituting various lagged-effects. Contributions from 1982 are used to explain votes 
in 1979 and 1980. suggesting a future money effect on votes. No explanation is given 
why the vote equations were modeled in this manner. He reports that contributions are 
not significant in explaining votes until 1979.
Three studies specifically address the issue of the timing of contributions and 
votes. Saltzman (1987) uses a lagged-effects model to test the appropriateness of the
1 We state the assumption here, though it is never explicitly made in the
study.
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simultaneous model." Contributions received in 1979-80 were used to predict COPE-* 
scores in 1981-82. and COPE scores from 1977-78 were used to predict contributions 
in 1979-80. Saltzman concludes from ordinary least squares results that the 
simultaneous (i.e.. contemporaneous) model is as appropriate as the lagged-effects model 
since the Rr's are virtually the same. There are at least two problems with this 
conclusion. First, ordinary least squares procedures are inappropriate for the 
contributions equation because the dependent variable is censored.4 Second, given the 
simultaneous nature of the equations, the R"?s have questionable relevance. Despite 
these limitations. Saltzman does recognize the importance of alternative model 
specifications.
Grenzke (1989) includes both previous and current contribution variables in her 
vote indices equations. Only incumbent behavior is studied. She finds that the level of 
either contributions variable does not effect voting behavior and that changes in the 
contributions variables do not influence changes in voting behavior.
Stratmann (1995) specifically tests the effects of lagged and current contributions 
on votes by looking at votes taken at the end of the years 1981 and 1985. The 1981 
vote equation includes both contributions received in 1981 and those received in 1979-
2 Quotation marks are added since Saltzman refers to only the 
contemporaneous model as “simultaneous”, meaning “occurring at the same time”. But 
the lagged-effects model exists in a simultaneous framework, too. since the errors are 
correlated with explanatory variables.
J AFL-CIO Committee on Political Education.
4 For a discussion of the properties of the least squares estimator in the 
censored regression model, see Judge et al. (1988) Chapter 19.
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80. (An analogous procedure was used to estimate the 1985 votes). A three-equation 
model is estimated. In nine out of ten votes analyzed, current contributions have a 
larger impact on legislator's votes than previous period contributions. Stratmann 
concludes that legislators are less compelled to pay off (with votes) contributions that 
helped them get elected than for contributions that will help them get re-elected in the 
future, and that contributions from several cycles need to be considered in any campaign 
reform debate.
The mixed results from these studies raise important questions concerning the 
specification and interpretation of vote and contributions equations. Do contributions 
have significant distributed lag effects? Do they have significant future effects? Over 
how many periods do contributions have potential effects? The next section 
systematically explores the timing mechanism between roll call votes in the Senate and 
AMP AC contributions.
2.3 Models
In the theoretical model o f the market for legislation, senators supply legislation 
and interest groups and constituents demand legislation. Interest groups contribute to 
"buy" favorable legislation, and legislators attempt to remain in office (i.e.. get re­
elected) by weighing the costs and benefits of voting in a particular manner.
A two-equation model of senator voting behavior and AMP AC contribution 
behavior from 1979 through 1992 is presented. The direction of causality cannot be 
assumed. Factors influencing the tendency of a senator to vote pro-AMA may also 
cause AMP AC to contribute more to that senator. Votes and contributions are both
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endogenous in the system of equations and are correlated with the error terms of the 
equation in which they appear as explanatory variables. We use two-stage generalized 
least squares and Tobit estimations, respectively, to estimate the vote indices and 
contributions equations. Instrumental variables estimated using all exogenous variables 
in the system in the first stage replace the endogenous right-hand side variables in the 
second stage. We estimate four alternative models with different timing schemes to 
further examine the relationship between roll call votes and AMP AC contributions. 
Variable names and definitions are the same as in Chapter 1.
2.3.1 Vote Index Equation
As described in Chapter 1, senators vote on bills of interest to the AMA based 
on the expected utility from voting pro-AMA (VOTE=l) versus voting against the 
AMAs stance (VOTE=0).3 The expected utility functions are assumed to be linear and 
the corresponding probabilities of voting pro-AMA and against the AMA are 
Pr[VOTE=l] = F(Xv'p v) and 
Pr[VOTE=0] = 1-F(XV'PV).
Assuming that the errors are bivariate normal. F(Xv'p v) is the cumulative 
distributions function for a standard normal random variable. The single vote equation
is
VOTE =
' 1 with Prob P = F(XV'PV)
0 with Prob 1-P (2.1)
3 Some subscripts used in the first chapter are not used here unless
required for clarification.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
57
This single vote equation is estimated using Probit analysis in Chapter 1. While 
the analysis o f single votes is worthwhile, the corresponding results apply only to those 
individual votes. The AMA may have narrow policy concerns, but to more fully 
capture the impact of the AMA over a range issues, a vote index is created from the 
individual votes.6 As discussed previously. VOTE INDEX is the ratio of pro-AMA 
votes to total votes during a voting cycle. We also separate votes based on specificity: 
a narrow vote index and a broad vote index are created as in Chapter 1. The equation 
to be estimated is
VOTE INDEX = Xv‘pv + ev (2.2)
VOTE INDEX is a continuous variable between 0 and 1 and is estimated using 
generalized least squares. The factors assumed to explain VOTE INDEX include the 
interest group variables: AMA$ (contributions received from AMP AC). %AMA (the 
percentage of senator's state doctor population that belongs to the AMA). and 
AMAOPPS (AMPAC contributions to the senator's opponent); individual senator's 
characteristics, including VOTE MARGIN (the margin by which the senator won in the 
last election). PARTY (the political party of the senator. PARTY=1 if Republican. 0 if 
Democrat). ADA (the senator's ADA rating), and TENURE (how many years the 
senator has been in the Senate); and constituency characteristics %ELDERLY (the 
percentage of the senator's state population that is 65 over years of age). INCOME (real
6 This study is concerned with AMP AC's overall influence on legislative 
agendas. Evidence of influence on specific votes is not indicative of influence on 
senators' voting patterns in general over issues of concern to AMP AC. Therefore, the 
vote index is used instead of single votes.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
58
per capita income of the senator's state), and EAST, SOUTH. MIDWEST (the region 
of the country the senator represents). The justification for inclusion of these particular 
variables is the same as in Chapter 1.
2.3.2 Contributions Equation
While vve do not specify a “utility function" for the AMA. we assume the group 
contributes money to senators rationally. By examining the AMA's Compendium o f 
Statements. it is possible to infer AMA preferences over certain issues. This "revealed 
preference" is assumed to represent the AMA's interests, whether it be the group's 
common interests or the leadership's interests.
The equation of interest is 
AMA$* = Xc '[3C + ec 
and is fully derived in Chapter 1. The equation to be estimated is
AMASj =
' AMAS = X 'pc+e if AMAS > AMA;0 
0 otherwise (2.3)
Given this formulation, the contributions equation is estimated using the Tobit 
procedure. The factors assumed to affect the level of contributions are the VOTE 
INDEX and control variables. The control variables are PARTY. CAMPGN (whether 
the senator is facing an upcoming election). INCUMBENCY (the senator's incumbency 
status). TOTALOPPS (contributions received by the senator's opponent). ADA. regional 
dummy variables (EAST. SOUTH. MIDWEST), and Senate committee membership
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dummies (BUGET. FINANCE. FOREIGN RELATIONS. G O V T AFFAIRS. SMALL 
BUSINESS)
2.3.3 Estimation of Models
The vote indices and contributions equations are estimated in a simultaneous 
framework to allow for correlation between endogenous explanatory variables and the 
error terms. We create instruments using all exogenous variables in the system to 
replace the endogenous right-hand side variables. The statistical software package SAS 
is used to estimate the vote indices equations and the contributions equations using GLS 
and Tobit techniques, respectively.
The first model is based on the usual assumptions about the timing of the 
contract between senators and contributors: that is. senators vote in response to last 
period contributions and AMP AC contributes contemporaneously. The next three 
models are designed to allow for symmetry of the contract between senators and the 
AMA. In the second model, senators vote in anticipation of being paid-off in the next 
cycle and AMP AC contributes in order to reward past voting behavior. The third model 
assumes senators and AMP AC exchange money and votes contemporaneously. Both 
agents observe the behavior of the other and respond in the same period. The fourth 
model assumes senators respond in the current period by voting to pay-off past 
contributions and AMP AC invests in future votes.
These models can be written as:
Model #1: VOTE INDEX=f(AMA$t_,.  )
AMA$t=g(VOTE IN D E^ ) Lagged-Cunent
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Model #2: VOTE INDEXt=f(AMA$t+l. ..... )
AMA$t=g(VOTE INDEX,.,, ) Future-Lagged
Model #3: VOTE INDEX=f(AMA$t, ......)
AMA$t=g(VOTE INDEX,. ......) Current-Current
Model #4: VOTE INDEX^AM AS,., .... )
AMA$t_,=g(VOTE INDEX,. ..... ) Lagged-Future
The model labels above will be used in the discussion to follow. The first term
in the label refers to the timing of contributions relative to votes. The second term
refers to the timing of votes relative to contributions.
2.4 Results 
2.4.1 Vote Indices Equations Results
2.4.1.1 Full Vote Index
Table 2.1 presents the results of the full vote index equations using the different 
timing schemes. The data are corrected for heteroskedasticity as in Chapter I. The 
predicted direction of effect is given below each variable name. We report root mean 
squared errors (RMSE)7 and F-values.
2.4.1.1.1 Interest Group Variables
We are primarily interested in the impact AMA contributions and AMA 
membership has on roll call voting behavior. We use one-tailed tests of significance 
since the effects are hypothesized to be positive. None of the models examined
7 RMSE =\/MSEwhere MSE=- -̂ i r. . SSE is the model sum of squared
n-p
errors, n is the number of observations and p is the number of parameter estimates.
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Table 2.1 
Full Vole Index Equation 











AMAS .0000012 .000000613 -.000002932 .000000814
(+) (.979) (.679) (2.466) (1.008)
%AMA .0104 .1139 .0674 .010
(+) (.120) (1.165) (.7083) (.116)
AMAOPPS .00000003 .00000013 -.000000633 .000000553
(-) (.035) (.148) (.6479) (-541)
Control Variables
VOTE MARGIN .08511 .0306 .113 .0948
(?) (.931) (.306) (1.1226) (1.033)
PARTY -.04248 -.0947* -.0175 -.0399
(?) (1.519) (3.236) (.5793) (1.444)
ADA -.000162 .000502 .000077 -.000129
(?) (.357) (1.027) (.1544) (.286)
TENURE .003385* .0026 .0023 .0036*
(?) (2.67) (1.912) (1.6768) (2.765)
%ELDERLY 1.071* .147 1.305* 1.092*
(?) (2.392) (.291) (2.6494) (2.435)
INCOME .0000107* .0000028 .0000136* .0000105*
(?) (2.408) (.556) (2.7736) (2.365)
EAST -.00289 .0202 -.0142 -.0014
(?) (.091) (.571) (.0142) (.045)
SOUTH -.0366 -.0065 -.0280 -.0378
(?) (1.14) (.186) (.028) (1.178)
MIDWEST -.03998 -.0328 -.0498 -.0402
(?) (1.204) (.895) (.0498) (1-21)
CONSTANT 1.3828 2.020 1.467 1.391
(6.761) (9.357) (6.508) (6.788)
RMSE 1.4277 1.4086 1.42083 1.42766
F-Value 7.310 5.316 7.909 7.287
* Significant at the .05 level
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provide evidence of vote-buying. The choice of model specification does not alter this 
result.8 In the first, second, and fourth models, AMAS is positive as hypothesized, but 
insignificant. %AMA is positive across all models but is also not statistically 
significant.
2.4.1.1.2 Control Variables
The variables that significantly affect votes are fairly consistent across the first, 
third, and fourth model: TENURE. %ELDERLY and INCOME positively influence 
pro-AMA voting. Overall, these models tend to produce similar parameter estimates for 
the interest group and control variables.
Estimates from the second model (Future-Lagged) differ substantially from those 
of the other models. It would be nice if there were a statistical test to determine the 
correct model. Unfortunately, no such test exists. We report the root mean squared 
error (RMSE) as a measure of the variability of the estimates. The RMSE for the first, 
third, and fourth models are similar, as are the parameter estimates.
2.4.1.2 Narrow Vote Index
The results for the narrow vote index equation are given in Table 2.2. Recall 
that twenty-one votes of narrow specificity are used in the formation of the index. 
These key votes are more important to the AMA and. if contributions have an effect, 
we expect to find it for these votes.
8 Using a two-tailed test, the third model shows a significant negative effect. 
This is inconsistent with rational interest group behavior and we reject the specification 
of the relationship between AMA contributions and voting behavior in that model.
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Table 2.2
Narrow Vote Index Equation 











AMAS 0.000001 0.000002 -0.000002 0.0000006
(+) (0.600) (1.591) (1.594) (0.574)
%AMA 0.237* 0.369* 0.283* 0.237*
(+) (1.993) (2.676) (2.316) (1.997)
AMAOPPS -0.0000006 -0.0000006 -0.000001 -0.0000002
(-) (0.498) (0.515) (0.908) (0.15)
Control Variables
VOTE MARGIN 0.207 0.15 0.232 0.218
(?) (1.646) (1.063) (1.841) (1.725)
PARTY 0.0319 -0.0499 0.045 0.027
(?) (0.829) (1-21) (1.158) (0.712)
ADA -0.00056 0.0002 -0.0006 -0.0006
(?) (0.899) (0.316) (0.925) (0.992)
TENURE 0.0025 0.001 0.002 0.0026
(?) (1.435) (0.656) (0.904) (1.47)
%ELDERLY 1.899* 0.907 2.106* 1.937*
(?) (3.082) (1.272) (3.361) (3.138)
INCOME 0.0000046 -0.000003 0.000007 0.000005
(?) (0.744) (0.432) (1.125) (0.756)
EAST -0.0426 -0.003 -0.051 -0.0412
(?) (0.978) (0.067) (1.174) (0.943)
SOUTH -0.1065* -0.094 -0.103* -0.11*
(?) (2.423) (1.909) (2.344) (2.497)
MIDWEST -0.1317* -0.137* -0.14* -0.133*
(?) (2.882) (2.656) (3.055) (2.902)
CONSTANT -0.2913 0.362 -0.217 -0.277
(1.035) (1.189) (0.761) (0.982)
RMSE 1.96441 1.9859 1.96132 1.96448
F-Value 8.587 4.923 8.781 8.569
* Significant at the .05 level
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2.4.1.2.1 Interest Group Variables
As predicted by interest group theory, the AMA contributions and membership 
variables have a stronger influence on narrow roll call votes than on broad votes. The 
AMA contributions variable is positive in all the equations except in the third model 
(Current-Current), and is marginally significant (at the .10 level) in the second model 
(Future-Lagged). The latter finding suggests that contributions affect narrow votes when 
the senator responds to funds to be received in the next period. The % AMA variable 
is positive and significant across all models, suggesting that state AMA membership or 
direct potential votes are more important than monetary contributions in explaining 
narrow roll call votes.
2.4.1.2.2 Control Variables
Demographic and regional variables (%ELDERLY, SOUTH, and MIDWEST) 
are significant and have the same sign across models, except for in the second model. 
TENURE and INCOME, significant in explaining the full vote index, are not important 
in the narrow vote index equation. As with the full vote index, the first, third, and 
fourth models produce similar parameter estimates and root mean squared errors.
2.4.1.3 Broad Vote Index
Table 2.3 reports parameter estimates for the broad vote equation. Recall that 
the broad vote index contains votes on issues of a more diffuse social nature and 
represent the broad ideological concerns of the AMA.
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Table 2.3 
Broad Vote Index Equation 











AMA$ -0.000000121 0.000000046 -0.000003 0.0000009
(+) (0.076) (0.038) (2.263) (0.873)
%AMA -0.0775 0.017 -0.0156 -0.0767
(+) (0.690) (0.130) (0.136) (0.683)
AMAOPPS 0.0000007 0.000001 -0.00000005 0.0000012
(-) (0.570) (0.805) (0.041) (0.938)
Control Variables
VOTE MARGIN -0.0183 -0.0582 0.0062 -0.0128
(?) (0.154) (0.433) (0.052) (0.107)
PARTY -0.0442 -0.0607 -0.0168 -0.041
(?) (1.216) (1.549) (0.460) (1.140)
ADA 0.00092 0.0011 0.001 0.001
(?) (1.550) (1.752) (1.803) (1.702)
TENURE 0.00295 0.0028 0.0019 0.0033
(?) (1.790) (1.500) (1.141) (1.950)
%ELDERLY 0.7618 0.1295 1.00 0.7752
(?) (1.308) (0.191) (1.691) (1.330)
INCOME 0.0000199* 0.000012 0.000023* 0.00002*
(?) (3.440) (1.685) (3.847) (3.377)
EAST 0.0146 0.0223 0.0037 0.0175
(?) (0.355) (0.471) (0.089) (0.424)
SOUTH 0.0283 0.0636 0.0367 0.026
(?) (0.681) (1.365) (0.889) (0.622)
MIDWEST 0.0210 0.0347 0.0099 0.02
(?) (0.486) (0.708) (0.228) (0.464)
CONSTANT 1.8137 2.276 1.895 1.815
(6.819) (7.87) (7.06) (6.81)
r m Se 1.85697 1.88676 1.8501 1.85596
F-Value 7.050 4.018 7.487 7.079
* Significant at the .05 level
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
6 6
2.4.1.3.1 Interest Group Variables
None of the interest group variables (AMA$. % AMA., and AMAOPPS) 
significantly affect voting behavior on broad issues. Interest group theory predicts that 
interest groups are less successful in influencing votes with diffuse benefits, votes which 
face higher opposition, and votes with higher visibility. The costs to the interest group 
to influence these types of votes outweighs the benefits to the group. These 
characteristics describe the votes used in the construction of the broad vote index.
2.4.1.3.2 Control Variables
INCOME is significant in explaining the broad vote index in the first, third, and 
fourth models. No other variables are important in explaining voting on these broad 
votes. We believe these results are due to the nature of the votes. Higher visibility 
compels the senator to respond more to constituency pressure. More opposition (and 
support) groups are associated with these votes. Since we do not include measures of 
visibility or opposition (or support) and since the votes are aggregated over a range of 
issues, the lack of significant findings is not surprising.
As in the full and narrow vote indices equations, the estimates and root mean 
squared error from the second model differ from the other three models. III. B. AMA
2.4.2 Contributions Equations Results
In this section, we present the results of the Tobit estimation of AMA 
contributions. The contributions equation is estimated three times; the full vote index, 
the narrow vote, and the broad vote index are each used as the explanatory variable of 
major concern.
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Due to model specification, the first and third models have the same results. The 
reported results indicate the direction of effects on the observed dependent variable. The 
t-statistics from the two-stage estimation are reported, as well as the t-statistics calculated 
using Bootstrap standard errors.9 Predicted directions of effects are below the 
parameter estimates.
2.4.2.1 Using Full Vote Index
Table 2.4 presents the results for the contributions equation using the full vote 
index as a right-hand side variable. We are primarily concerned with the effects of the 
voting behavior on contributions.
2.4.2.1.1 Full Vote Index
The full vote index is positive and marginally significant (at the .10 level) in 
explaining AMA contributions in the fourth model (Lagged-Future). In the other 
models, roll call voting behavior does not significantly affect AMA contributions. As 
we discussed in Chapter I. there may be other motives for contributing money, such as 
ensuring access once a senator is elected. But we see some evidence here that the AMA 
may be paying senators for future votes.
2.4.2.1.2 Control Variables
CAMPGN is the only variable significant across all models. Whether a senator 
is facing an upcoming election appears to affect AMA contributions. This raises the
9 The Bootstrap method of estimating standard errors is described fully in 
Chapter I. The same techniques used there are used in this chapter.
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Table 2.4 
AMA Contributions Equation 
Full Vote Index as Explanatory Variable 
2-Stage Tobit Estimates and t-Statistics







VOTE INDEX -2685.93 225.43 3906.30
(+ ) (.792) (0.048) (1.601)
(,736)a (.061) (1.341)
Control Variables
PARTY 5678.18 3661.80 1295.35
(+ ) (2.409) (1.067) (.753)
(2.105) (1.253) (.447)
CAMPGN 12697.16 19231.12 21074.82
(+ ) (5.835) (5.313) (15.443)
(3.75) (3.658) (3.799)
INCUMBENCY -4821.74 -4034.003 -1377.04
(?) (2.619) (1.667) (.994)
(2.346) (1.603) (.543)
TOTALOPPS 0.0017 0.0019 .00044
(+ ) (3.198) (2.77) (1.068)
(1.78) (1.726) (.401)
ADA -8.273 -58.27 -100.67
(?) (.222) (1.08) (3.698)
(.271) (1.218) (2.109)
EAST -1002.46 -1027.8358 -3240.8172
(?) (.3669) (.2923) (1.634)
(.228) (.341) (1.066)
SOUTH 3443.46 1169.11935 681.146231
(?) (1-421) (.3693) (.3805)
(1.31) (.384) (.222)
MIDWEST 2845.31 3554.81897 -1381.7643
(?) (1.132) (1.121) (.7503)
(.929) (1.103) (.428)
(table con’t)
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BUDGET 313.27 -517.881 135.4408
(+ ) (.1439) (.1879) (.0839)
(.035) (.228) (.058)
FINANCE 4480.35 5193.0001 2012.557661
(+ ) (2.055) (1.9094) (1.232)
(1.806) (1.942) (.753)
FOREIGN RELATIONS -3975.77 -5803.0359 -843.49886
(+ ) (1.550) (1.8020) (.4667)
(1.425) (2.121) (.312)
G O V T AFFAIRS -2894.40 -1933.9381 -2379.8108
(+ ) (1.093) (.5848) (1.275)
(1.343) (.800) (.991)
SMALL BUSINESS 3311.08 4363.69368 370.4739
(+ ) (1.474) (1.5478) (.9132)
(1.558) (1.759) (.149)
CONSTANT -60392.88 -52721.854 -83294.52
(6.101) (2.008) (7.067)
(2.849) (8.367) (13.912)
Log Likelihood Value -2875.029685 -2268.85973 -2981.330539
a t-statistic calculated from the bootstrap standard error. 1000 pseudo-data sets 
each containing 700 observations are created from the original data set.
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question, does the underlying structure of contributing behavior differ in election and 
nonelection years? We examine this issue in the next chapter.
The significance of many of the other control variables is sensitive to the timing 
scheme employed. PARTY, INCUMBENCY, TOTALOPPS, ADA. FINANCE, and 
SMALL BUSINESS are significant in some models but not in others. These variables 
are not of primary interest and an analysis of their sensitivity to timing specification is 
beyond the scope of this paper.
We report the value of the log likelihood function for each model simply for 
comparison across models. Intuitively, parameter estimates that achieve a large 
likelihood function are more likely to be the true parameters than for estimates which 
produce a smaller likelihood function.10
2.4.2.2 Using Narrow Vote Index
Interest group theory predicts that the AMA cares more about senators’ voting 
behavior on key issues. According to Gopoian (1984). interest groups motivated by 
narrow policy concerns select a set of key votes to use as a litmus test of loyalty and 
allocate contributions based on the voting record on those votes. If the AMA rewards 
senators for favorable voting, we expect the rewards to be greater for favorable voting 
on bills which are more important to the AMA. Table 2.5 presents results using the 
narrow vote index as an explanatory variable.
!0 Maximum likelihood estimation chooses values of the (unknown) 
parameters that maximize the probability of obtaining the sample actually observed. 
See Judge et al. (1982) Chapter 6. for further discussion.
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Table 2.5
AMA Contributions Equation 
Narrow Vote Index as Explanatory Variable 
2-Stage Tobit Estimates and t-Statistics







VOTE INDEX 74.88 1773.99 3613.13
(+ ) (.0292) (.533) (1.795)
(.0913)a (.598) (1.291)
Control Variables
PARTY 5555.58 3521.62 1108.66
(+ ) (2.354) (1.025) (.574)
(2.034) (1.209) (.383)
CAMPGN 12529.30 19197.14 21151.71
(+ ) (5.801) (5.306) (13.373)
(3.697) (3.518) (3.768)
INCUMBENCY -5069.22 -4280.49 -1476.05
(?) (2.732) (1.759) (.980)
(2.492) (1.646) (.580)
TOTALOPPS 0.00173 0.00181 .0004
(+ ) (3.129) (2.657) (.975)
(1.731) (1.616) (.365)
ADA -12.83 -59.99 -98.86
(?) (.349) (1.123) (3.170)
(-387) (1.281) (2.092)
EAST -1192.68 -1035.41 -3305.77
(?) (-439) (.295) (1.472)
(.3308) (.343) (1.095)
SOUTH 3234.71 1166.19 634.69
(?) (1.343) (.369) (.344)
(1.223) (.386) (.208)
MIDWEST 2765.68 3647.67 -1390.05
(?) (1.103) (1.149) (.706)
(.899) (1.145) (.430)
(table con’t)
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BUDGET 323.60 -544.93 133.07
(+ ) (.149) (-198) (.077)
(.0397) (.238) (.058)
FINANCE 4570.47 5253.64 1951.48
(+ ) (2.09) (1.964) (1.090)
(1.758) (1.978) (.754)
FOREIGN RELATIONS -3933.35 -5757.81 -799.10
(+ ) (1.535) (1.789) (.402)
(1.42) (2.128) (.294)
GOVT AFFAIRS -2920.43 -1817.17 -2103.55
(+ ) (1.104) (.550) (1.044)
(1.338) (.751) (.868)
SMALL BUSINESS 3259.07 4299.54 240.12
(+ ) (1.447) (1.525) (.137)
(1.519) (1.741) (.097)
CONSTANT -66687.73 -55059.89 -79543.96
(4.123) (2.245) (6.233)
(12.915) (9.184) (14.188)
Log Likelihood Value -2875.344903 -2268.73 -2980.82866
a t-statistic calculated from the bootstrap standard error. 1000 pseudo-data sets 
each containing 700 observations are created from the original data set.
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2.4.2.2.1 Narrow Vote Index
The narrow vote index is positive and marginally significant at the . 10 level in 
the fourth model. Consistent with interest group theory, it appears the AMA cares 
about the narrow votes and contributes in hopes of capturing favorable legislation in the 
next period. The other models show no evidence that roll call voting behavior, even 
on narrow votes, influences AMP AC contributions. The choice of model determines 
whether votes are influential or not.
2.4.2.2.2 Control Variables
CAMPGN is significant across all models. PARTY, INCUMBENCY, ADA. 
FINANCE, FOREIGN RELATIONS, and SMALL BUSINESS are significant in 
explaining AMA contributions in some models, but their significance depends on the 
model specification.
2.4.2.3 Using Broad Vote Index
The results for the contributions equation using the broad vote index as an 
explanatory variables are presented in Table 2.6. Theory predicts that votes on broad 
social issues should have less of an effect on AMA contributions.
2.4.2.3.1 Broad Vote Index
Table 2.6 shows no evidence that voting behavior on broad issues significantly 
affects AMA contributions. The results are, again, consistent with interest theory. The 
AMA has weaker preferences for votes with diffuse benefits and does not reward (or 
punish) based on these votes. The AMA states their position on a variety of broad 
issues, but evidence suggests that the votes do not affect contributing decisions.
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Table 2.6 
AMA Contributions Equation 
Broad Vote Index as Explanatory Variable 
2-Stage Tobit Estimates and t-Statistics







VOTE INDEX -251.50 -546.79 -772.37
(+ ) (.091) (.151) (.359)
(.347)a (.220) (.302)
Control Variables
PARTY 5571.26 3692.37 1858.92
(+ ) (2.369) (1.075) (.980)
(2.054) (1.103) (.550)
CAMPGN 12543.63 19229.83 21064.55
(+ ) (5.808) (5.315) (13.373)
(3.715) (3.425) (3.485)
INCUMBENCY -5048.56 -4010.43 -870.89
(?) (2.773) (1.674) (.589)
(2.44) (1.615) (.348)
TOTALOPPS 0.00174 0.0019 .00049
(+ ) (3.146) (2.79) (1.190)
(1.755) (4.208) (.959)
ADA -12.160 -56.7 -85.04
(?) (.325) (1.049) (2.706)
(.323) (1.162) (1.591)
EAST -1166.59 -998.16 -3226.65
(?) (.427) (.284) (1.438)
(.2272) (.416) (1.317)
SOUTH 3265.58 1217.05 870.18
(?) (1.344) (.384) (.473)
(1.25) (.469) (.336)
MIDWEST 2781.84 3584.23 -1445.36
(?) (1.106) (1.130) (.733)
(.917) (1.389) (.593)
(table con’t)
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BUDGET 314.17 -557.11 206.16
(+) (.144) (.202) (.120)
(.022) (.327) (-118)
FINANCE 4556.94 5165.04 1764.00
(+) (2.09) (1.898) (.988)
(L84) (2.634) (.881)
FOREIGN RELATIONS -3930.90 -5834.46 -913.57
(+) (1.535) (1.811) (.460)
(1.437) (3.352) (.505)
GOVT AFFAIRS -2910.10 -1952.18 -2292.73
(+) (1.099) (.591) (1.137)
(1.32) (1.012) (1.125)
SMALL BUSINESS 3260.49 4356.02 -78.56
(+) (1.450) (1.545) (.044)
(1.532) (2.128) (.039)
CONSTANT -66071.12 -51077.49 -76236.15
(3.915) (1.977) (5.779)
(12.77) (5.322) (10.326)
Log Likelihood Value -2875.341182 -2268.836575 -2982.37656
a t-statistic calculated from the bootstrap standard error. 1000 pseudo-data sets 
each containing 700 observations are created from the original data set.
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2.4.2.3.2 Control Variables
CAMPGN is positive and significantly affects AMA contributions. 
INCUMBENCY, TOTALOPPS, FINANCE, FOREIGN RELATIONS, AND SMALL 
BUSINESS are important determinants of contributions in some models and not in 
others.
2.5 Conclusions
The ad hoc modeling of votes and contributions in previous roll call vote 
analyses raises questions concerning the timing of the contract between senators and the 
AMA. Does the timing of the exchange of votes and contributions matter? Do 
contributions received in different periods have dissimilar effects on votes? Does the 
AMA consider past, current, or future voting behavior when it makes its contributing 
decisions? We examine four alternative models of voting and contributing behavior 
based on different timing schemes. We allow for lead, lag, and current effects of 
AMA contributions on votes and of senators’ voting behavior on contributions.
As predicted by interest group therapy, AMA contributions and membership 
have a stronger influence on narrow roll call votes than broad votes. There is (weak) 
evidence that contributions affect narrow votes when the senator responds to funds 
received in future. The results suggest that senators are forward-looking in their voting 
behavior.
AMA membership is positive and significant in explaining narrow votes. This 
result is insensitive to model specification. AMA membership represents potential
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lobbying force or direct potential votes, and appears to be more important in explaining 
senators’ voting behavior on narrow roll call votes than monetary contributions.
We find (weak) evidence that future voting behavior affects AMA contributions. 
The full vote index and narrow vote index are marginally significant in explaining 
contributions when contributions are modeled as a function of future votes. The broad 
vote index is not important in explaining contributions in any of the models. Consistent 
with theory, the narrow vote matters to the AMA relatively more than the broad votes.
Interest groups have parochial policy concerns and broad ideological 
concerns.11 This categorization of concerns parallels our narrow and broad vote 
indices. We find marginal evidence that the AMA is an interest group with 
predominantly parochial concerns, although it may outwardly express its broad 
ideological concerns to Congress and the public.
In summary, we find only weak evidence that AMA contributions affect Senate 
roll call votes, even when we use different timing mechanisms to model the exchange 
of votes and contributions. As in Chapter 1, we are a bit surprised at the lack of strong 
significant findings, given the amount of money the AMA contributes to senators. 
Marginally significant findings suggest that senators and the AMA are forward-looking 
in their behavior. Other studies that examine the timing of contributions and votes only 
use lagged and current contributions, so this finding is unique in the literature.
The results on some of the control variables in the contributions equations lead 
us to question whether we have properly modeled the relationship between votes and
11 Gopoian (1984)
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contributions. The variable CAMPGN (whether a senator is facing an upcoming 
election) is positive and statistically significant in all models. The result is insensitive 
to the choice of vote index as explanatory variable (full, narrow, or broad). But by 
using a dummy variable to measure the effects of an upcoming election, we assume that 
the underlying structures of voting and contributing behavior are the same for election 
years and nonelection years. In the next chapter, we drop that assumption and 
investigate whether the relationship between votes and contributions differs with the 
election cycle.
Some Senate committees are significant in determining AMA contributions. We 
expect this result since committee members have power over the content of bills and 
over whether a bill ever reaches the full Senate. Since we find only weak evidence of 
AMA influence, we question whether the roll call vote on the floor of the Senate is the 
appropriate variable to analyze. We continue our search for significant AMA influence 
on legislation in Chapter 4 by considering the importance of committee membership.
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CHAPTER 3
TESTS FOR STRUCTURAL CHANGE BETWEEN ELECTION 
AND NONELECTION YEARS
3.1 Introduction
Whether or not a senator is facing an election affects her demand for campaign 
contributions. We expect the demand for funds to increase during re-election campaigns, 
especially in close races. Most studies of roll call votes and PAC contributions do not 
differentiate between those congressmen facing an upcoming election and those who are 
not. If favorable voting attracts PAC money, and senators vote differently in elections 
years, then this needs to be controlled for in the vote equation. Similarly, if PACs 
respond to the increase in demand for funds and contribute differently during election 
years, this. too. should be incorporated into the equation explaining contributions.
Only one study we reviewed includes a variable to capture different behavior due 
to the election cycle. Kau. Keenan, and Ruben (1982) include a dummy variable in the 
contributions equation, equal to 1 if the winner was in a primary. This variable is 
highly significant in predicting contributions in four out of six cases. Our survey 
revealed no other study that examines the effects that election and nonelection years 
have on either voting behavior or contributing behavior.
In the previous chapters, we find little evidence of significant contributions 
effects on roll call votes. In this chapter, we extend our search for significant effects 
by looking for a more appropriate model of the relationship between senators and the 
American Medical Association (AMA). We test for structural change in the models of 
voting by senators on bills of interest to the AMA and in the contributing behavior of
79
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the American Medical Political Action Committee (AMPAC) across election cycles. We 
estimate all models, allowing for different underlying structures, to examine the 
simultaneous effects of votes on contributions and contributions on votes. The data are 
the same as in previous chapters, and the derivation of the equations and explanation of 
estimation techniques are provided in Chapter I.
The analyses in Chapter 1 and 2 include the variable CAMPGN in vote and 
contributions equations. Recall that CAMPGN is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
senator is facing an upcoming election in either the current period or the next period, 
thereby causing an increase in demand for campaign funds. This variable was highly 
significant in all equations. The dummy variable specification assumes that the 
underlying structural equations (for both votes and contributions) are the same for 
election and nonelection years. In the following section, we test whether this assumption 
is valid.
3.2 Estimation and Tests
To test the null hypothesis of no structural change, we divide the data into 
election and nonelection year observations. We perform Chow tests (Chow. 1983) on 
the vote equations and perform Likelihood Ratio tests on the contributions equations. 
Both of these tests rely on estimation of a restricted model (no structural difference 
between election and nonelection years) and an unrestricted model (estimation of the 
model for observations only in an election year and then for observations only in 
nonelection years). For a review of dependent and independent variables in the vote 
indices equations, see below.
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Dependent Variable
VOTE INDEX= ratio of pro-AMA votes to total votes 
Independent Variables
Interest Group Variables
AMAS = contributions from AMP AC
%AMA = percent of the state's doctor population that are AMA members 
OTHGRPS = contributions from an interest group other than AMP AC 
SYNERGY = interaction term between AMAS and OTHGRPS 
AMAOPPS = contributions from AMP AC to the senator's opponent in the last 
election
Control Variables (Senator Characteristics and Constituency Characteristics)
VOTE MARGIN = electoral margin received by the senator in the last election 
PARTY = 1 if Republican. 0 if Democrat
ADA = Americans for Democratic Action rating (liberal to conservative rating) 
TENURE = number of years that the senator has been in the U.S. Senate 
%ELDERLY = percent of the state's population that is over 65 years old 
INCOME = state's real per capita income 
EAST. SOUTH. MIDWEST = regional dummies
Equations for the full, narrow, and broad vote indices are estimated using 
generalized least squares. (We use the same categorization of votes as in previous 
chapters). We use the resulting sums of the squared errors to calculate the test statistic 
which has an F-distribution. The test determines if the underlying structure of voting 
behavior is different in election years and nonelection years.
The calculated test statistic is
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u=[SSEr-SSEu)/K]/(SSEu)/T-K1
SSE is a measure of the unexplained variation in the dependent variable (vote 
index). SSEr > SSEU because, in the restricted model, the parameter estimates may only 
take on certain values. The test statistic u is large if SSEr and SSEU are sufficiently 
different, and the null hypothesis of no structural difference between election years and 
nonelection years is rejected.
The AMA contributions equations are specified in previous chapters. For a 
review of the dependent and independent variables, see below.
Dependent Variable
AMAS = contributions from AMP AC 
Independent Variables
VOTE INDEX = ratio of pro-AMA votes to total votes 
Control Variables
PARTY= I if Republican. 0 if Democrat
CAMPGN = 1 if senator is facing an upcoming election. 0 otherwise
INCUMBENCY = 1 if senator is an incumbent. 0 otherwise
TOTALOPPS = total campaign receipts of the senator's opponent
ADA = Americans for Democratic Action rating (liberal to conservative rating)
EAST. SOUTH. MIDWEST = regional dummies
BUDGET = 1 if on the Budget Committee. 0 otherwise
FINANCE = 1 if on Finance Committee. 0 otherwise
FOREIGN RELATIONS = 1 if on Foreign Relations Committee. 0 otherwise
GOV'T AFFAIRS = 1 if on Governmental Affairs Committee. 0 otherwise
SMALL BUSINESS = 1 if on Small Business Committee, 0 otherwise
1 T=number of observations=700 and K=number of explanatory variables=l 1. SSEr 
is the sum of squared errors from the restricted model (all observations) and SSEU is the 
sum of the sum of squared errors from the unrestricted model (nonelection and election).
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Tobit estimation is used for the three contributions equations and are estimated 
via maximization of the log likelihood. (Each equation includes one of the vote indices 
as an explanatory variable.) The values of the likelihood functions are then used to 
compute the log likelihood test statistic which is distributed as a chi-square random 
variable. The Likelihood Ratio test statistic is LR= 2(lnLu-lnLr).2
The null hypothesis o f no structural difference restricts the set of values the 
parameter estimates can take. This restricts the possible values for the maximum value 
of the likelihood function. If the values of the likelihood functions are close, then the 
estimates from the restricted and unrestricted models are close, the test statistic (LR) is 
small, and we do not reject the null hypothesis.-5
In Chapter 2. we examined four models of different timing schemes between 
votes and contributions. We found weak evidence of forward-looking behavior for both 
senators and the AMA. We examine those four models here. The models are defined 
as follows:
Model #1: VOTE INDEX=f(AMA$t_,. ...... )
AMA$t=g(VOTE INDEXj, ) Lagged-Current
Model #2: VOTE INDEX,=f(AMA$t+, ...... )
AMA$t=g(VOTE INDEX^j. ) Future-Lagged
Model #3: VOTE IN D E X ^f AMA$t, ...... )
AMA$t=g(VOTE INDEXt. .....) Current-Current
~ lnLu is the sum o f the values of the likelihood functions for nonelection and 
election year samples and lnLr is the value of the likelihood function using pooled 
observations.
J See Judge et al. (1988). Chapter 3.
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Model #4: VOTE INDEX^AM ASj.,  )
AMA$t.j=g(VOTE [N D E ^  ) Lagged-Future
3.3 Results
Table 3.1 shows the results from the Chow tests for the vote equations and the 
Likelihood Ratio tests for the contributions equations, as well as the critical values for 
the chi-square and F-distributions.
3.3.1 Vote Equations Results
Models 1 and 4 show no evidence of a structural change in senators' voting 
behavior between election and nonelection years. Models 2 and 3 indicate differences 
in voting behavior for the full vote index and Model 2 also shows differences for the 
broad vote index. These Findings are consistent with the arguments that broad roll call 
votes on major social issues are highly visible and that senators have to be more 
responsive to constituents' preferences on these issues.
In contrast, none of the models find evidence of structural change in voting 
behavior on narrow votes indices. This result is consistent with the interest group theory 
assumption of rationally ignorant voters. Voters tend to be unaware of narrow interest 
group votes so senators are not pressured to vote differently in election years. Our 
results indicate that senators are consistent in their voting behavior on issues that are 
important to the AMA.
3.3.2 Contributions Equations Results
The null hypothesis of no structural change for the contributions equations is 
soundly rejected in all models. This is intuitively appealing; one would expect the
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Table 3.1
Tests for Structural Change Between Election and Nonelection Years
Chow Test of Vote Equations 
u=[(SSEr-SSEu)/K]/(SSEu)/T-K
Likelihood Ratio Test of Contributions 
Eqn.
LR= 2(lnLu-lnLr)
Model 1: Using Lagged Contributions3 
Full Vote Index u=l.5000815
Narrow Vote u=l.200863
Broad Vote Index u=l. 18957
Model 2: Using Future Contributions 
Full Vote Index u=2.04133*
Narrow Vote Index u=1.6303
Broad Vote Index u= 1.81367*
Model 3: Using Current Contributions 
Full Vote Index u=l.88542*
Narrow Vote Index u=l.35003
Broad Vote Index a=l .516875
Model 4: Using Lagged Contributions 
Full Vote Index u=l.l7473
Narrow Vote Index u=.9493
Broad Vote Index u=1.0391
Model 1 and 3: Using Current Votesb 
Using Full Vote Index LR=300.43* 
Using Narrow Vote Index LR=298.69* 
Using Broad Vote Index LR=293.68*
Model 2: Using Lagged Votes 
Using Full Vote Index LR=244.21* 
Using Narrow Vote Index LR=243.76* 
Using Broad Vote Index LR=244.27*
Model 4: Using Future Votes 
Using Full Vote Index LR=I32.98* 
Using Narrow Vote Index LR=133.57* 
Using Broad Vote Index LR= 132.97*
Fc=l.80c X2C=19.675 l c
* The null hypothesis of no structural change is rejected with a 95% confidence interval. 
a The labeling reflects the timing of the endogenous explanatory variable. 
b Recall that the specification of contributions in Model 1 and 3 are the same. 
c Critical values with a=.05.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
86
underlying structures o f the supply and demand functions for contributions during 
election years to be different from those in nonelection years.
Evidence from Table 3.1 shows that estimating the contributions equations by 
pooling election and nonelection years is not appropriate. To better explore contributing 
behavior, we examine the election year and nonelection year results in the following 
section. We compare the parameter estimates from the unrestricted models and test for 
significant differences.
3.3.2.1 Comparison of Parameter Estimates for Contributions Equations
In this section, we report the regression results for AMA. contributions equations 
in both election and nonelection years. Again, we use Tobit estimations to obtain 
parameter estimates. To test whether the parameter estimates from the two models are 
significantly different, we use a dummy variable model to allow the slope parameters 
to change. Maintaining the Tobit framework, the equation we estimate is
AMAS =
where now.
\ AMAS* if AMAS* > AMAS0 
0 otherwise
K
AMAS * = a  + £  (Xkfpk+XkCAMPGN5k)+e (3.1)
k  = l
CAMPGN is a dummy variable equal to one if the senator is facing an upcoming 
election and zero otherwise. For a nonelection year, the parameter estimate for the kth 
explanatory variable is pk. In an election year, the parameter estimate is Pk+5k. The
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statistical significance of Sk determines whether the parameter estimates from election 
and nonelection years are significantly different.
3.3.2.1.1 Full Vote Index
Tables 3.2 gives the results from the Tobit estimation of AMA contributions in both 
election and nonelection years with the full vote index as an explanatory variable. The 
first row for each variable is for nonelection years and the second row is for election 
years. The t-statistic for significant difference is provided. Asterisks denote statistical 
significance (at the .05 level) within the equation.
Table 3.2 shows no evidence that voting on the full range of votes affects 
contributions. This result holds for both election and nonelection years. In Chapter 2. 
we found (weak) evidence that future votes affect contributions (Model 4). When we 
estimate the two subsamples, election and nonelection years, this result disappears, 
suggesting that the results found in Chapter 2 are due to pooling election and 
nonelection year observations.
The significance of the control variables varies according to model specification and 
the sample used. TOTALOPPS maintains significance across both samples for Models 
1 (and 3) and 2. and during nonelection years for Model 4. Similarly. PARTY is 
significant for both samples in Model 1 (and 3). in election years for Model 2. and in 
nonelection years in Model 4.
The significance of committee membership is sensitive to the sample and model 
specification. Being on the Finance Committee is important during election years in
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Table 3.2
Tobit Estimation of AMA Contributions Equations 
Comparison of Election/Nonelection Year Results 
Full Vote Index as Explanatory Variable







Nonelection -4824.95 1312.798 4571.922




Nonelection 2627.09* -1169.9098 4146.807*
Election 6235.38* 7673.483* -302.153
(2.916)* (4.774)* (4.445)*
INCUMBENCY
Nonelection -2559.62* -592.1479 3060.999*
Election -3296.80 -2350.30 -827.116
(1.564) (.309) (2.826)*
TOTALOPPS
Nonelection .000705* 0.000759* .00099*
Election .00217* .002689* -.000055
(.604) (-141) (2.047)*
ADA
Nonelection 28.282 -25.85 -63.707*
Election -81.267 -68.861 -14.165
(.173) (2.074)* (.420)
EAST
Nonelection -792.62 367.336 -4089.43
Election -1352.70 -1857.0617 289.504
(.171) (.101) (.093)
SOUTH
Nonelection 2536.13* 1048.86 1321.40
Election 1703.403 231.43 2109.74
(.517) (.955) (.770)
(table corf t)
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Nonelection 266.41 745.718 -174.20
Election 4815.96 4448.93 1620.88
(1.697)* (.981) (2.257)*
BUDGET
Nonelection 281.203 -643.846 19.001
Election -178.122 -665.044 324.898
(-318) (.600) (.420)
FINANCE
Nonelection 293.88 216.714 928.19
Election 5576.35* 4953.98 1021.92
(1.196) (-807) (.173)
FOREIGN RELATIONS 
Nonelection 288.216 -134.6909 -2722.90
Election -9657.42 -9909.1 -171.0
(1.693)* (1.230) (2.065)*
GOV'T AFFAIRS 
Nonelection -3494.91 -4132.96 -635.335
Election -3494.91 -3236.722 394.37
(.582) (1.061) (.096)
SMALL BUSINESS 
Nonelection 1806.92* 3368.229* 1422.02
Election 1026.21 2571.777 1283.59
(-716) (1.151) (.239)
CONSTANT
Nonelection -45402.72* -48435.907* -50455.708
Election 928.30 5440.05 -32296.08*
* Significant at the .05 level.
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the first model and membership on the Small Business Committee is important in 
nonelection years in the first (and third) and second models.
Based on the t-statistics of difference between parameter estimates, we find that the 
estimates for the full vote index, using current votes, are statistically different from 
each other. The parameter estimates are the marginal change in the AMA’s willingness 
to contribute, given a one percent change in the vote index. The AMA willingness to 
contribute, based on voting behavior, significantly increases during elections. Of the 
control variables that have significantly different estimates, only PARTY and 
TOTALOPPS are statistically significant in the equation.
3.3.2.1.2 Narrow Vote Index
Table 3.3 shows the results from using the narrow vote index in the contributions 
equations in election and nonelection years.
The results presented in Table 3.3 are similar to those in Table 3.2. Again, there 
is no evidence that votes affect AMA contributions, even when the votes are of greater 
importance to the AMA. In Chapter 2, we found future voting behavior on narrow 
votes (weakly) affects contributions. The result does not hold when the data separated 
into election and nonelection years. This suggests the result in Chapter 2 is due to 
pooling of the data.
The control variables that are significant in explaining contributions when the 
narrow vote index is used are essentially the same as when the full index is used. 
PARTY, INCUMBENCY, TOTALOPPS, ADA, FINANCE, AND SMALL BUSINESS 
impact contributions, but their significance is dependent on election cycle and timing
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Table 3.3
Tobit Estimation of AMA Contributions Equations 
Comparison of Election/Nonelection Year Results 
Narrow Vote Index as Explanatory Variable







Nonelection -3182.19 -631.503 1745.63




Nonelection 2605.93* -122.84 4184.79*
Election 6042.74* 7839.11 -258.82
(3.721)* (4.948)* (4.576)*
INCUMBENCY
Nonelection -2476.15* -374.36 3269.37*





Election .002191* .00272 -.00009
(.470) (-203) (2.082)*
ADA
Nonelection 21.48 -24.842 -52.02*
Election -77.94 -68.979 -15.61
(-370) (2.098)* (.610)
EAST
Nonelection -1048.26 -350.724 -4018.25
Election -1170.04 -1939.62 130.15
(.318) (.116) (.114)
SOUTH
Nonelection 2269.38* 1128.91 1455.37
Election 1825.69 155.724 2055.49
(1.080) (.986) (.844)
(table corft)
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Nonelection 28922 775.557 -155.04
Election 5036.63 4307.84 1586.69
(1.774)* (.961) (2.242)*
BUDGET
Nonelection 84.744 -597.79 -32.97
Election -363.13 -524.267 230.89
(.737) (.763) (.485)
FINANCE
Nonelection 523.121 286.55 701.62
Election 5428.884* 4828.61 937.29
(.987) (.748) (.196)
FOREIGN RELATIONS 
Nonelection 258.35 -54.31 -2710.90
Election -9729.04 -9919.28 -183.54
(1.639) (1-221) (2.004)*
G O V T  AFFAIRS 
Nonelection -3675.25 -3976.621 -722.50
Election -4044.88 -3324.47 338.02
(.617) (1.025) (-127)
SMALL BUSINESS 
Nonelection 1986.095* 3345.70* 1124.23
Election 842.033 2666.64 1135.63
(.737) (1.156) (-125)
Constant
Nonelection -50625.34* -45153.236* -43435.28*
Election 2570.68 5476.109 -33577.39*
* Significant at the .05 level.
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specification. The parameter estimates that are significantly different for election and 
nonelection years are basically the same ones as when the full vote index is used. The 
AMA willingness to contribute, based on voting behavior, increases during election years 
relative to nonelection years.
3.3.2.1.3 Broad Vote Index
Table 3.4 shows the regression results for AMA contributions in election and 
nonelection years when the broad vote index is used as a regressor.
Table 3.4 shows no evidence that votes influence AMA contributions. When the 
data are separated into election and nonelection year, the major determinants of 
contributing behavior are the same whether voting is on narrow issues or broad issues. 
The magnitude of the effects o f these determinants, however, varies between election 
and nonelection years. The overall results of the AMA contributions equations are 
essentially insensitive to vote specificity when modeled according to the election cycle.
The vote index parameter estimates are significantly different from each other, as 
they were with the full and narrow vote indices (for the first, third, and fourth models). 
The underlying willingness to contribute in response to voting behavior is higher during 
election years, perhaps due to the increase in demand for funds during those years. 
Parameter estimates for PARTY. INCUMBENCY. ADA. and FOREIGN RELATIONS 
differ significantly between election and nonelection years. In order to capture the 
different marginal effects on the AMA's willingness to contribute, we cannot pool the 
data across all years.
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Table 3.4
Tobit Estimation of AMA Contributions Equations 
Comparison of Election/Nonelection Year Results 
Broad Vote Index as Explanatory Variable







Nonelection -981.72 562.67 167.24




Nonelection 2467.72* -1232.64 4500.40*
Election 6266.83* 7609.12* -275.54
(3.879)* (5.030)* (4.350)*
INCUMBENCY
Noneiection -2948.54* -476.45 3533.62*
Election -3117.28 -2535.82 -851.28
(2.038)* (.472) (2.851)*
TOTALOPPS
Nonelection .0007* .00076* .00104*
Election .0021* .00259* -.000057
(-687) (-175) (-311)
ADA
Nonelection 23.79 -25.75 -54.07
Election -84.17 -78.13 -14.0
(.652) (2.239)* (.258)
EAST
Nonelection -930.63 -384.06 -4020.17
Election -1398.19 -1817.01 261.61
(.389) (.084) (.213)
SOUTH
Nonelection 2299.72* 1085.56 1561.86
Election 1663.77 82.71 2111.88
(1.207) (1.145) (.593)
(table con't)
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Nonelection 205.01 711.36 -180.44
Election 4669.01 4590.41 1636.22
(1.999)* (1.072) (2.180)*
BUDGET
Nonelection 159.51 -614.94 -38.19
Election -46.50 -252.36 287.45
(-539) (-719) (.472)
FINANCE
Nonelection 742.13 241.08 577.43
Election 5666.85* 5223.35 1012.67
(.818) (.862) (.285)
FOREIGN RELATIONS 
Nonelection 419.57 -92.94 -2712.31
Election -9879.30 -9683.11 -170.37
(1.666)* (.618) (2.070)*
GOV'T AFFAIRS 
Nonelection -3442.53 -4063.19 -854.06
Election -4244.23 -3102.69 416.81
(.603) (1.098) (.195)
SMALL BUSINESS 
Nonelection 2001.18* 333.07* 977.42
Election 1142.17 2566.45 1257.71
(.745) (1 .190) (.154)
CONSTANT
Nonelection -53466.44* -47038.44* -42896.46*
Election 949.72 -3346.56 -32621.73*
* Significant at .05 level.
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3.4 Conclusions
A senator's demand for campaign contributions increases when facing an upcoming 
re-election campaign. In examining the relationship between senators and contributors, 
empirical models should allow for this increased demand for funds during election years. 
Other studies of roll call votes have pooled election and nonelection year observations, 
but we suspect this is not the proper specification.
Tests of structural change show relatively stable voting behavior across election and 
nonelection years, especially on issues of narrow concern to the AMA. but the 
underlying structure of contributing behavior is not. Simply including a dummy variable 
in contribution equations to capture the effect of election years is not appropriate.
We estimate separate equations for AMA contributions using election and 
nonelection year samples and find no evidence that voting behavior affects AMA 
contributions. In Chapter 2. we used pooled data and found weak evidence that future 
voting on narrow issues affects contributions. We do not find that result here. The 
overall results are fairly insensitive to vote specificity. The major determinants of 
contributions are relatively stable when the three vote indices are used as explanatory 
variables (full, narrow, and broad). Their estimated effects on the AMA's (underlying) 
willingness to contribute, however, vary across nonelection and election samples. Since 
our estimated equations are reduced form equations, the results are consistent with 
changes in the underlying supply and demand functions for contributions in election 
years.
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Our primary goal in this study is to discover the roie o f AMA contributions in the 
Senate. While we find no evidence that AMA contributions affect votes or that the 
AMA rewards senators for favorable voting, there is strong evidence that the underlying 
process generating contributing behavior is not the same in all years. We conclude that 
empirical studies of the relationship between votes and PAC contributions should allow 
for structural change. In the search for better models o f PAC behavior and influence, 
differences in the underlying structural model should be modeled appropriately.
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CHAPTER 4
THE IMPORTANCE OF COMMITTEE MEMBERSHIP
4.1 Introduction
Some researchers criticize roll call vote analyses for not taking into consideration 
the complex process a bill goes through before reaching the floor o f the Senate. They 
argue that the final floor vote is merely a formality and is not the proper variable to 
examine to find evidence of PAC influence.1 Statistical models o f roll call votes may 
underestimate the influence of campaign contributions on legislative outcomes because 
they omit an important element of the legislative process, committee action.
Previous chapters find little or no evidence that contributions from the American 
Medical Association (AMA) affect Senate roll call votes. In this chapter, we continue 
our investigation into the role of AMA contributions in the U. S. Senate by looking at 
the importance of Senate committee membership. No one committee has jurisdiction 
over health policy in the Senate, so we choose five committees for analysis. We select 
committees based on the amount of American Medical Political Action Committee 
(AMPAC) contributions received by its members, and because many bills of concern 
to the AMA are referred to these committees.
The committees considered are the Senate Budget. Finance. Foreign Relations. 
Government Affairs, and Small Business Committees. In Chapter 1. we found evidence 
that membership on the Finance Committee positively affects AMA contributions. In
1 Andrew J. Seltzer (1995) and R. Douglas Arnold (1990) both argue the
importance of committee action relative to floor action.
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Chapter 2. we discovered that membership on the Finance and Small Business 
Committees significantly affects contributions (in models where current votes are used 
to explain contributions). If membership on certain committees influences the level of 
contributions received, do these contributions, in turn, influence senators' voting 
behavior? In this chapter, we examine the voting behavior of members of the 
committees mentioned above in a continued search for AMP AC effects on legislation.
There are many sources from which bills originate. In addition to congressmen, 
interest groups, citizen groups, bar associations, chambers of commerce, and individuals 
have the right to petition and transmit their proposals to members of Congress.2 The 
senator who has agreed to sponsor a bill usually introduces it by presenting it to a clerk 
at the Presiding Officer's desk, without commenting on it on the floor of the Senate.-5 
The Presiding Officer's desk then sends a copy of the bill to the chairman of the 
committee to which it is referred. The committee reviews the bill, discusses reports 
from subcommittees, and sometimes makes amendments. (Amendments are changes to 
the bill as introduced and are subject to rejection or acceptance by the full Senate.) 
Committee members vote whether the committee will report favorably or “table" the 
bill. (By tabling a bill, the committee effectively kills the bill.) If the committee 
reports favorably, it may report the bill with or without amendments, or. if extensive
2 The following discussion pertains to the Senate, although the procedure in the 
House of Representatives is very similar.
5 A more formal procedure may be used, in which the senator rises and introduces 
the bill on the floor, but more commonly it is presented to the Presiding Officer's desk.
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amendments have been approved, report a "clean bill". A committee seldom adversely 
reports a bill, since tabling a bill effectively prevents action on it.
Committee action is public record, but is less visible, and is conducted in a 
smaller arena of activity than the Senate floor. While the full Senate does not 
necessarily abide by the recommendations o f the referring committee when voting, the 
committee has power over whether a bill goes to the full Senate for a vote and over the 
content of the bill. Therefore, we expect that PACs direct their efforts to committee 
members in order to influence legislation.
To test for PAC influence in committees. Keiser and Jones (1986) examine 
committee action under the assumption that contributions are likely to exert more 
influence on committee votes than floor votes. The dependent variable is support for 
President Carter's 1979 hospital cost containment proposal, a bill that the AMA 
vehemently opposed. In addition to analyzing House floor votes. Keiser and Jones 
examined votes in the Ways and Means Committee and the Energy and Commerce 
Committee. AMA contributions had the hypothesized sign in both committees, but were 
significant only in the Energy and Commerce Committee. Keiser and Jones concluded 
that the Energy and Commerce Committee was the legislative forum in which the AMA 
was most able to exert influence.
We would like to use the models presented in previous chapters to examine 
committee roll call votes. Applying the simultaneous models developed in Chapters 1-3 
might reveal AMA influence at the committee level even though it is not found at the 
Senate floor level. Unfortunately, the required data are not available. We face several
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sample sizes, we cannot use multivariate analysis of committee members individual roll 
call votes.4 Pooling the individual votes creates a sufficiently large data set. but to 
obtain unbiased parameter estimates, we must assume the parameters are equal across 
equations. Likelihood ratio tests reveal that pooling cross-sectional data on individual 
votes to create a large sample is inappropriate due the inequality of parameter estimates 
across vote equations.3
Because of these data limitations, multivariate analysis cannot be used to 
examine committee decisions. Several qualitative methods can be used to determine the 
influence of AMP AC on such decisions. Chow tests of structural differences indicate 
whether committee members vote differently from non-members. Correlation 
coefficients show whether vote indices and AMP AC contributions are related (using 
only committee members). Finally, contingency tables and associated nonparametric 
tests identify the independence or association between votes (of committee members) 
and AMP AC contributions.
4.2 Tests for Structural Differences and Measure of Correlation
We divide the full sample of vote indices into subsamples of committee members 
and non-members and estimate the vote indices equations using two-stage general least 
squares.6 We test the full, narrow, and broad vote indices equations for structural
4 The maximum sample size for a roll call vote for committee members is twenty.
5 We estimated the votes of committee members and non-members separately and 
use the unrestricted and restricted log likelihood values to compute the likelihood ratio 
test statistic. All calculated t-statistics soundly reject the null hypothesis of equal 
coefficients across vote equations.
6 The equation specification is the same as in the vote indices equations in 
Chapter 1.
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change using Chow tests.7 The test determines if the underlying structure of voting 
behavior is different for committee members and non-members. A list of the dependent 
and independent variables in the vote indices equations follows.
Dependent Variable
VOTE INDEX = ratio of pro-AMA votes to total votes 
Independent Variables
Interest Group Variables
AMA$ = contributions from AMP AC
%AMA = percent of the state's doctor population that are AMA members 
OTHGRPS = contributions from an interest group other than AMP AC 
SYNERGY = interaction term between AMA$ and OTHGRPS 
AMAOPPS = contributions from AMP AC to the senator's opponent in the last 
election
Control Variables (Senator Characteristics and Constituency Characteristics!
VOTE MARGIN = electoral margin received by the senator in the last election 
PARTY = 1 if Republican. 0 if Democrat
ADA = Americans for Democratic Action rating (liberal to conservative rating) 
TENURE = number of years that the senator has been in the U.S. Senate 
%ELDERLY = percent of the state's population that is over 65 years old 
INCOME = state's real per capita income 
EAST. SOUTH. MIDWEST = regional dummies
The calculated test statistic for the Chow test is 
u=[SSEr-SSEu)/K]/(SSEu)/T-K8
7 The categorization of votes according to specificity is defined in previous 
chapters.
8 SSEr is the sum of squared errors from the restricted model (which includes both 
committee members and non-members), SSEU is the sum of squared errors from the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
103
SSE is a measure of the unexplained variation in the dependent variable (vote 
index). SSEr > SSEU because, in the restricted model, the parameter estimates may only 
take on certain values. If SSEr and SSEU are sufficiently different, then the test statistic 
u is large and we reject the null hypothesis of no structural difference between members 
and non-members. Table 4.1 presents the results of the Chow tests.
Appendix E contains the full regression results.
Table 4.1 shows that the structures of all three vote indices equations differ for 
committee members and non-members of the Finance Committee. The structures for 
the full and narrow vote indices significantly differ for the Small Business Committee. 
The structures of the full vote index equations are different in the Foreign Relations 
Committee. The results do not indicate whether contributions cause differences in voting 
behavior, but they provide evidence that the underlying processes generating voting 
behavior are different for members of some committees.
Combining these results with the findings in Chapters 1 and 2. the Finance and 
Small Business Committees are "important" in the sense that the AMA contributes 
relatively more to members of these committees, and the voting behavior of these 
committee members is structurally different from non-members. The results are not 
evidence of a causal relationship between votes and contributions, but they do suggest 
the need for further investigation. To further explore the relationship between votes and
unrestricted model (the sum of the sum of squared errors from the regressions for 
members and non-members). K is the number of explanatory variables, the T is the 
number of observations.
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Table 4.1 
Tests for Structural Change 
Vote Indices Equations 
Senate Committee Members Versus Non-Members
Chow Test of Vote Equations 
u=[(SSEr-SSEu)/K]/(SSEu)/T-K
Budget Committee Full Vote Index u=1.16
Narrow Vote u=.905
Broad Vote Index u=1.34
Finance Committee Full Vote Index u=2.28*
Narrow Vote Index u=1.91*
Broad Vote Index u=1.85*
Foreign Relations Committee Full Vote Index u=1.95*
Narrow Vote Index u=.954
Broad Vote Index u=1.45
Governmental Affairs Committee Full Vote Index u=.574
Narrow Vote Index u=.662
Broad Vote Index u=.775
Small Business Committee Full Vote Index u=2.92*
Narrow Vote u=2.89*
Broad Vote Index u=1.42
F.05-1-80
* Significant at the .05 level.
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contributions, we examine correlation coefficients for the vote indices and AMP AC 
contributions next.
The correlation coefficient between votes and contributions depends on their 
covariance9 (which measures linear association), and their variances. Correlation is 
defined as
cov(vote.contributions)
Pvote.contribution ~  -  , -  —
/var(vote) v/var(contributions)
The correlation coefficient is a number that falls between -1 and 1. If votes and 
contributions are independent, then P vo te.ccmtributions ecluals zero- The absolute value of 
P v o te  contributions vv̂  he higher the more votes and contributions are linearly related.
Table 4.2 shows the correlation coefficients the full, narrow, and broad indices 
and AMA contributions for members of the five Senate committees. Allowing lagged, 
current, and future contributions to have different correlations with votes, we report the 
correlation coefficients for votes and contributions received in the period prior to the 
vote, contributions received in the same period, and contributions received in the next 
period. P-values for the null hypothesis of zero correlation are in parentheses.
The significant finding in Table 4.2 is the correlation between the full vote index 
and AMP AC contributions in the Foreign Relations Committee. All other correlation 
coefficients are not significantly different from zero. These results provide very little 
evidence that votes and AMP AC contributions are related and are consistent with the
9 The more votes and contributions jointly vary from their means, the higher their 
covariance will be.
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Table 4.2
Correlation Between Vote Indices and AMP AC Contributions for 
Senate Committee Members 








Full Vote Index .0803 -.0376 -.0937
(.3238) (.6430) (.2834)
Narrow Vote Index .0665 -.0843 .0421
(.4128) (.2988) (.6302)
Broad Vote Index -.0055 0658 -.1111
(.9459) (.7220) (.2026)
Finance Committee 
Full Vote Index -.0026 .0759 -.0272
(.9756) (.3743) (.7693)
Narrow Vote Index .0298 .0620 .1343
(.7273) (.4683) (.1454)




Full Vote Index .2297** -.1215 -.1467
(.0106) (.1806) (.1372)
Narrow Vote Index .0398 -.0374 .1413
(.6618) (.6705) (.1524)
Broad Vote Index -.0225 -.0076 -.2342
(.8052) (.9337) (.167)
Gov’t Affairs Committee 
Full Vote Index .0739 -.0423 -.1167
(.4517) (.6668) (.2652)
Narrow Vote Index -.1245 .0752 -.0214
(.2034) (.4434) (.8389)
Broad Vote Index -.0094 .1101 -.1336
(.9241) (.2610) (.2019)
Small Business Committee 
Full Vote Index -.0942 -.0018 .0092
(.3041) (.9841) (.9266)
Narrow Vote Index -.1012 -.0631 .0515
(.2695) (.4915) (.6069)
Broad Vote Index -.1142 .0573 -.0472
(.2124) (.5322) (.6376)
** Significant at the .01 level.
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findings in Chapters 1-3. In those chapters, there is very little evidence that AMP AC 
contributions buy favorable legislation and that voting behavior affects contributions.
The Chow tests show structural differences in voting between some committee 
members and non-members, but the correlation coefficients fail to show significant 
association between votes and contributions except in the Foreign Relations Committee. 
In the next section, we use nonparametric procedures to examine the relationship 
between votes and AMA contributions without making inferences about the variables' 
means or variances.
4.3 Nonparametric Tests
Up to this point in this study, we assume the observations come from certain 
parametric families of distributions. The values of the parameters are not known, but 
appropriate multivariate techniques provide parameter estimates. We then make 
statistical inferences about the significance of the parameter estimates.
In this section, we make no assumptions about the particular distributions from 
which the observations come. The observations are classified according to two 
categories, vote and contributions. A senator votes either 0 (against the AMA stance) 
or 1 (pro-AMA) and receives either zero AMP AC contributions or positive AMP AC 
contributions. This categorization produces a two-way contingency table to test the 
hypothesis that the two categories are independent. We also calculate a nonparametric 
measure of correlation using the data in the table.
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4.3.1 Independence
The null hypothesis that votes and contributions are independent is in the 
statistical sense; that is. if we randomly select a senator from the population, the 
probability that she votes a particular way and receives positive contributions is equal 
to the probability that she votes a particular way times the probability she receives 
positive contributions.10
Development of the test statistic is as follows: The contingency table contains 
R rows and C columns. For i =  l,...,R and j = l,...,C, Ey denotes the maximum 
likelihood estimate of the expected number of observations that is classified in the idl 
row and j*  column of the table, given that the null hypothesis is true.11 Then
Ejj = (Nj+N+p/n
where Ni+ is the total number of observations in row i, N +J- is the total number of
observations in column j, and n is the total number of observations in the table.
The test statistic, Q, is calculated as 
R C
where Ny is the number of observations in the cell located in row i and column j. Q
10 An intuitive explanation might be: If the null hypothesis o f independence is 
rejected, then knowing one variable (contributions) can "tell us something" about the 
other variable (vote).
11 To show that Ey is the M.L.E. of the expected number of observations in cell ij. 
let py=probability of being in cell ij. E(Ny)=npy When H0 is true, py=pi+p+j. (pi+ is 
the probability of being in row i and p+j is the probability of being column j). Let 
£j + and 0 +jdenote M.L.E.'s of pi+ and p+j. Then Ey =npi+£„j. Since £i + =Nj+/n and 
p +J- =N_j/n. it follows that Ey =n[(NiJ./n)(N+j/n)]=(Ni+N_l.j)/n.
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follows a x 2 distribution with (R-1)(C-1) degrees of freedom. If the actual number of 
observations in a cell sufficiently differs from the expected number of observations, Q 
is large and we reject the null hypothesis of independence.
4.3.2 Degree of Association
The value of the Q statistic presented above provides a measure of the degree 
of association between votes and contributions. If there is no association between votes 
and contributions, then the observed frequency in each cell is very close to the expected 
frequency since the expected frequency is calculated under the null hypothesis of 
independence. The higher the degree of association, the larger the difference between 
observed and expected frequencies will be. The contingency coefficient. C, measures 
the degree of association between votes and contributions. C equals zero when there 
is no association between votes and contributions and approaches one as the association 
increases. (The contingency coefficient is significantly different from zero only when 
the null hypothesis of independence is rejected.) The contingency coefficient is
calculated as C =
n+Q
4.3.3 Contingency Tables
Table 4.3 shows the contingency tables for the five Senate committees. 
Contributions are AMP AC contributions received in the period prior to the vote.12
12 We also examine votes and current contributions, and votes and future 
contributions using contingency tables. No evidence of dependence is found in any of 
the committees.
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The table includes row and column totals, as well as table totals. We report the test 
statistics Q and C, which are defined above, for each committee. Recall that the 
contingency coefficient is significantly different from zero only when the Q statistic is 
statistically significant.
Table 4.3 shows dependency between votes and contributions for the Budget 
Committee. We cannot infer a functional form of the relationship between votes and 
contributions, but the test statistic provides evidence of a significant relationship. The 
contingency coefficient for the Budget Committee is significantly different from zero, 
but does not suggest a strong degree of association between votes and contributions. 
The null hypothesis of independence between roll call votes and AMA contributions 
cannot be rejected in the other committees.
The results are, again, consistent with the results in Chapters 1-3: there is little 
evidence of a relationship between votes and contributions. However, these results 
differ from those in Table 4.2. In Table 4.2, there is no evidence of a relationship 
between votes and contributions in the Budget Committee. Only the correlation 
coefficient for the full vote index in the Foreign Relations Committee is significant. 
In Table 4.3, there is evidence of a significant relationship between votes and 
contributions in the Budget Committee, but no evidence of a significant relationship in 
the Foreign Relations Committee.
The correlation coefficient (pvote.contributions)’ and the contingency coefficient 
(C). do not assume a causal relationship between votes and contributions. However, 
the correlation coefficient depends on the degree of covariation between votes and
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Table 4.3
Contingency Tables for Selected Senate Committees 
Tests of Independence and Association Between Votes and AMP AC ConLribuLions
BUDGET Contributions =0 Contributions > 0
Vote=0 341 126 ^ = 4 6 7
Vote = l 284 161 =445
Q=8.941** 
C = .0985**
rt =625 r2=287 n=912
FINANCE Contributions =0 Contributions > 0
Vote=0 284 118 c x =402
Vote =  l 285 128 Co =413
Q = .260 
C = .035
rj=569 r2=246 n=815
FOREIGN RELATIONS Contributions =0 Contributions > 0
Vote=0 257 102 Cj =359
V ote=l 261 122 Co=383
Q = 1.04 
C = .037
1^=518 r2=224 n=742
GOVT AFFAIRS Contributions =0 Contributions >  0
Vote=0 196 86 C! =282
V ote=l 217 96 Co=313
Q = 1.101 
C = .043
r l =413 r2 = 182 n=595
SMALL BUSINESS Contributions =0 Contributions > 0
Vote=0 254 121 C! =375
Vote=l 263 98 Co =361
Q=2.307 
C = .056
rx =517 r2=219 n=736
** Significant at the .01 level.
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contributions, while the contingency coefficient does not consider variation in the 
variables from their means. Regardless of these differences, there still is little evidence 
that votes and AMP AC contributions are related.
4.4 Conclusions
Previous chapters of this study fail to find strong evidence that AMP AC 
contributions affect senators roll call votes or that voting behavior affects AMA 
contributions. In this chapter, we extend our investigation by analyzing the relationship 
between votes and AMP AC contributions for the members of five Senate committees 
(the Budget, Finance, Foreign Relations, Governmental Affairs, and Small Business 
Committees). We would like to examine the votes at the committee level since 
committee action is less visible and plays an important role in formulating legislation. 
Unfortunately, the data are not available. Therefore, we continue to use Senate floor 
roll call votes and AMPAC contributions, but move away from analyzing formal 
econometric models.
Chow tests confirm that the underlying structures of the processes generating all 
three categories of votes (full, narrow, and broad) differ for Finance and Small 
Business Committee members and non-members. The process generating the full vote 
index also differs across members and non-members of the Foreign Relations 
Committee. The results are consistent with results found in previous chapters, where 
membership on the Finance and Small Business Committees significantly affects 
AMPAC contributions.
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Correlation coefficients, which are measures of association between votes and 
contributions, show a significant relationship between roll call votes and contributions 
in the Foreign Relations Committee. There is no evidence of such a relationship in the 
other committees studied. Nonparametric tests derived from contingency tables show 
that votes and contributions are dependent (statistically) in the Budget Committee, 
though the degree of association is relatively low. The correlation coefficients and 
nonparametric test statistics of independence do not infer casual effects of AMA 
contributions on votes (or votes on contributions), but they indicate that a relationship 
exists between these variables in certain Senate committees.
According to interest group theory, PACs have more influence at the committee 
level than in the full Senate. Our Chow tests show that the underlying structure of roll 
call voting on votes important to the AMA differs for some committee members, 
although we find no direct evidence of AMPAC influence. We believe that roll call 
votes are not the appropriate variables to examine when looking for AMA contributions 
effects. When the data on committee votes are available, we hope to identify 
significant AMPAC influence by applying the procedures used in this study to 
committee-level data.
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Proponents of campaign reform assert PACs use their influence in Washington 
to affect legislation. To reduce interest group power, they advocate lowering the caps 
on campaign contributions. To determine the effects of such reform, knowledge of the 
relationship between interest group contributions and legislators is needed. Estimates 
of the effects of contributions on legislative outcomes are inconclusive. It is unclear 
whether PACs affect legislation and, if so, by what magnitude.
Our model portrays senators as utility-maximizing agents and the American 
Medical Association (AMA), through its political action committee, the American 
Political Action Committee (AMPAC), as a rational contributor. Contributions and roll 
call votes in the Senate from 1978-1992 are analyzed to test the "‘capture" theory. Our 
primary goals are to identify AMP AC contributions effects, to test the hypothesis that 
the AMA “rewards” senators for their voting behavior, and to determine the role of 
issue specificity. We use pooled, cross-sectional data in a simultaneous framework and 
extend the traditional analyses by examining alternative timing specifications, election 
year and nonelection year samples, and senate committee members and non-members.
We find little evidence to support the theory that AMP AC contributions affect 
roll call votes. Models of individual votes and three vote indices fail to show that 
AMA contributions significantly influence roll call votes or that senators’ voting 
behavior significantly influences contributions. A measure of lobbying support or 
potential direct votes does, however, affect votes of narrow concern to the AMA. The 
percentage of a state’s physician population that belongs to the AMA has a significant
114
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positive effect on pro-AMA votes of narrow specificity, indicating that AMA 
membership is more important than contributions in affecting senators’ voting behavior.
If AMA contributions do not influence roll call votes, the question arises, what 
do contributions “buy”? Roll call votes may not be the proper variable to measure 
influence in the political arena. Access, as measured by the time spent with legislators, 
may be the channel through which money is transformed into influence. While 
measurement of access is problematic, it should be considered for future research.
Our analysis of the importance of committee membership indicates that the 
underlying structures of the processes generating votes differ for the Senate Finance. 
Foreign Relations, and Small Business Committee members. Although nonparametric 
tests fail to show significant association between roll call votes and AMA contributions, 
theory suggests that PAC influence is greater at the committee level, where decisions 
are less visible. Again, we conclude that roll call votes on the floor of the Senate may 
not be the proper variable to analyze.
We explore whether the lack of influence of AMA contributions on roll call 
votes can be attributed to specification error. We specify and test alternative timing 
schemes, and we test for structural changes in voting and contribution behavior over 
the election cycle.
We find that the specification of the timing of the contract between senators and 
the AMA affects conclusions about determinants of vote outcomes and contributions. 
We estimate models of lead, lag, and current effects, and, while there is no strong 
evidence that contributions affect votes, there is weak evidence that senators respond
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to future AMA contributions when voting on issues of narrow concern to the AMA, and 
that (future) votes on key issues are important in explaining AMA contributions. We 
conclude that choosing a particular timing scheme affects results and that researchers 
should carefully consider the theoretical basis of the empirical specification.
Analyzing pooled data over all years (election and nonelection) does not appear 
to be the proper specification. Test results show that the underlying structural 
processes of voting and contributing behavior are different in election years and in 
nonelection years. While not a surprising result since the supply and demand forces 
in these years are conceivably different, most studies do not address this issue. But. 
again, we find no evidence of AMA influence on votes in either election or nonelection 
years.
Several issues of concern warrant further discussion. Measuring the strength of 
opposition to particular bills is problematic. It is difficult to identify opposing (or 
supporting) groups. Contributions received from these groups may not fully capture 
the strength of opposition through the dissemination of information to the public and 
lobbying efforts.
Evidence of logrolling in voting behavior has been shown to be important. 
(Stratmann, 1992 and 1995). Our model does not include logrolling in the vote 
equations. In the presence of logrolling, simple roll call vote analysis may be 
misleading. However, the use of AMA-specific issues in the narrow vote index is less 
susceptible to this problem since we do not expect logrolling over a set a narrow 
concerns.
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Future research should analyze alternative dependent variables to determine the 
role of AMA contributions and its translation into influence. We infer from our results 
that AMA contributions do not directly impact roll call votes. But roll call votes may 
not capture the indirect influence of AMA contributions through either access or 
committee action. The relationship between contributions and access, and the 
translation of access into influence, has not been thoroughly investigated.
We hope to analyze votes at the committee level if such data become available. 
We can then test the hypothesis that AMA contributions have a greater effect on 
committee action, where important legislative decisions are made and the lower 
visibility of such action may afford legislators greater freedom in responding to PAC 
interests.
While our results concerning the role of AMA contributions in the U. S. Senate 
may not hold for PACs in general, they do raise questions over the nature of campaign 
reform. If campaign contributions do not directly influence roll call votes, what impact 
will campaign reform have? At least eighteen bills relating to political action 
committees and campaign finance reform have been introduced in the 104th 
Congress.13 If changing vote outcomes through the reduction of interest group power 
is desired, proponents of current campaign reform might do well to consider the effects, 
or lack of effects, their legislation would have. A better understanding of the motives 
and effects of PACs on policy is needed before reform can have desired effects.
13 HR 2566, S 1219, S 116, HR 1427, HR 1837, HR 2566, S 1389, S 1528, HJ 
Res 171, HR 296, HR 732, HR 738, HR 1427, HR 1692, HR 1865, HR 2141, HR 
2830, and HR 3209.
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APPENDIX A: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Variable Minimum Maximum Mean Standard
Deviation
VOTE INDEX 0 1.0000000 0.5264195 0.2250942
NARROW VOTE INDEX 0 1.0000000 0.3909048 0.3217711
BROAD VOTE INDEX 0 1.0000000 0.6095952 0.3140899
LAGGED AMAS 0 122000.85 2368.97 8144.14
CURRENT AMAS 0 131685.22 2244.67 8848.35
FUTURE AMAS 0 201021.13 2717.89 12596.09
%AMA 0.134 0.9830426 0.5831667 0.1382322
AMAOPPS 0 186222.63 1178.98 8883.89
PARTY 0 1.0000000 0.4871429 0.5001921
CAMPGN 0 1.0000000 0.3371429 0.4730722
INCUMBENCY 0 1.0000000 0.6285714 0.4835322
TENURE 0 50.000000 9.1614286 7.9964905
TOTALOPPS 0 10756873.18 1219078.06 1219078.06
ADA 0 100.00000 45.4542857 31.8683706
VOTE MARGIN 0.43 1.0000000 0.5992071 0.0971467
LAGGED VOTE MARGIN 0.434 1.0000000 0.5948186 0.1015055
% WHITE 0.334 0.9900000 0.8659303 0.1153535
%ELDERLY 0.02 0.1830000 0.1117257 0.0223706
INCOME 3759.70 115446.82 8719.80 2202.54
BUDGET 0 1.0000000 0.2200000 0.4145425
FINANCE 0 1.0000000 0.1985714 0.3992098
FOREIGN RELATIONS 0 1.0000000 0.1757143 0.3808490
GOVT AFFAIRS 0 1.0000000 0.1514286 0.3587224
SMALL BUSINESS 0 1.0000000 0.1728571 0.3783941
N = 700.
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APPENDIX B: DESCRIPTION OF SENATE VOTES 1979-1992
(S)=AMA support 
(0)=AMA opposition
tin ComDl=Issue soecificallv mentioned in AMA Compendium of Statements 
'  *  /  »  •  *
1979 96th Congress First Session
S 440. Alcohol Abuse Prevention and Rehabilitation Act. Huddleston. D-Ky.. motion 
to table (kill) the Thurmond. R-SC.. amendment to require that a health warning label 
be placed on ail bottles of beverages containing 24% alcohol. Motion rejected 21-68: 
R 7-31: D 14-37. May 7. 1979. The Thurmond amendment was adopted subsequently 
by voice. (O) (In Comp)
1980 96th Congress Second Session
HR 3236. Disability Insurance. Bayh. D-Ind., amendment to eliminate the five-month 
waiting period for disability insurance benefits for persons who had diseases that two 
doctors had determined would lead to death within 12 months. Adopted 70-23: R 25-12: 
D 45-11. Jan. 30. 1980. (O) (In Comp)
1981 97th Congress First Session
S Con Res 19. Fiscal 1982 Budget Targets. Thurmond. R-SC.. amendment to add $300 
million in budget authority and $150 million in outlays for veterans' programs in fiscal
1982 and make offsetting cuts in health programs. Rejected 36-55: R 24-24. D 12-31. 
May 8. 1981. (O)
S 1377. Budget Reconciliation. Roth. R-Del.. amendment to delete a provision in order 
to retain Medicare as the primary payer of health insurance benefits for federal 
employees who are also covered by the Federal Employee Health Benefits programs. 
Adopted 51-47: R 15-38: D 36-9.* June 25. 1981. (S)
1982 97th Congress Second Session
HR 4961. Budget Reconciliation Tax Increases/Spending Cuts. Passage of the bill to 
increase taxes $99 billion for fiscal years 1983-85 and to cut welfare. Medicare and 
Medicaid spending $17 billion for the same three years, in compliance with 
reconciliation instructions in the fiscal 1983 budget resolution (S Con Res 92). Passed 
50-47: R 49-3: D 1-44. in the session which began July 22. 1982. (O) (In Comp)
S J Res 58. Balanced Budget/Tax Limitation Amendment. Passage of the joint 
resolution to propose an amendment to the Constitution to require a balanced budget at 
the beginning of each fiscal year unless a three-fifths majority of Congress agreed to
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deficit spending. The amendment could be waived during the time of a declared war. 
Passed 69-31: R 47-7: D 22-24. Aug. 4, 1982. A two-thirds majority of those present 
and voting (67 in this case) of both houses is required for passage of a joint resolution 
proposing an amendment to the constitution. A yea was a vote supporting the 
president's position. (S) (In Comp)
H J Res 631. Continuing Appropriations. Fiscal 1983/Federal Trade Commission. 
Rudman. R-NH.. motion to table (kill) the McClure. R-Idaho. amendment to bar the use 
of funds by the FTC to investigate or make rules relating to the medical or other 
professions that were licensed and regulated by the states. Motion agreed to 59-37: R 
31-21; D 28-16. In the session which began Dec. 6. 1982. A yea was a vote supporting 
the president's position. (O) (In Comp)
1983 98th Congress First Session
HR 1900. Social Security Act Amendments. Passage of the bill to overhaul the Social 
Security system, to revamp the way the federal government reimburses hospital for 
Medicare, to extend the federal supplemental unemployment, benefit program for six 
months and to increase Supplemental Security Income benefits. Passed 88-9: R 47-6: 
D 41-3. March 23. 1983. (0) (In Comp)
S Con Res 27. First Budget Resolution. Fiscal 1984. Dole. R-Kan.. amendment to 
provide $1.8 billion in fiscal 1983-85 for health care assistance for the unemployed. 
Adopted 90-9: R 45-9: D 45-0. May 5. 1983. (S) (In Comp)
S J Res 3. Human Life Federalism Amendment. Passage of the joint resolution to 
propose an amendment to the Constitution that would overturn the 1973 Supreme Court 
decision. Roe V. Wade, which made abortion legal. Rejected 49-50; R 34-19: D 15-31. 
June 28. 1983. A two-thirds majority of those present and voting (67 in this case) of 
both houses is required for passage of a joint resolution proposing an amendment to the 
Constitution. A yea was a vote supporting the president’s position. (O) (In Comp)
1984 98th Congress Second Session
HR 2163. Deficit Reduction. Dole. R-Kan.. motion to table (kill) the Kennedy. D- 
Mass.. amendment to the GOP-leadership deficit plan eliminating the increases in part 
B. covering out-of-pocket patient costs, in Medicare premiums and deductible. Motion 
agreed to 58-36: R 48-3; D 10-33. May 9. 1984 (S) (In Comp)
HR 4616. Motor Vehicle Safety/Minimum Drinking Age. Lautenberg, D-NJ.. 
amendment to withhold a percentage of highway funds from states whose minimum 
drinking ages are under 21 and to provide incentives for other actions aimed at reducing 
drunk driving. Adopted 81-16; R 45-10; D 36-6. June 26, 1984. A yea was a vote 
supporting the president's position. (S) (In Comp)
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
1985 99th Congress First Session
S 484. Saccharin Study and Labeling Act. Metzenbaum. D-Ohio, amendment to require 
special labeling of diet soft drinks containing aspartame, an artificial sweetener, to 
indicate how much of the additive they contain. Rejected 27-68: R 4-46; D 23-22. May 
7. 1985. (S) (In Comp)
S 43. Line-Item Veto. Quayle. R-Ind.. motion to invoke cloture (thus limiting debate) 
on the Quayle motion to proceed to the consideration of the bill to give the president 
power to veto individual spending items by requiring that appropriations bills be split 
by paragraph or section into separate bills before being sent to the White House. Motion 
rejected 57-42; R 45-7; D 12-35. July 18, 1985. A three-fifths majority vote (60) of 
the total Senate is required to invoke cloture. A yea was a vote supporting the 
president's position. (S) (In Comp)
S 1078. Federal Trade Commission Act Amendments. Kasten. R-Wis.. motion to table 
(kill) the McClure. R-Idaho. amendment to prohibit the FTC from using its jurisdiction 
over unfair or deceptive acts or practices to overrule state laws regarding the licensing, 
qualifications and permissible duties or tasks o f professional such as lawyers, doctors 
and dentists. Motion agreed to 71-26: R 30-21: D 41-5. July 25, 1985 (O) (In Comp)
S 1730. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation, Fiscal 1986. Durenberger. R-Minn.. motion 
to table (kill) the Bumpers. D-Ark.. amendment to provide Medicare coverage for 
"reasonable and medically necessary" liver transplants performed on individuals aged 18 
and over. Motion agreed to 51-47: R 45-7: D 6-40. Nov. 14. 1985. (O) (In Comp)
Bowen Nomination. Confirmation of President Reagan's nomination of Otis R. Bowen 
of Indiana to be secretary of The Department o f Health and Human Services. 
Confirmed 93-2; R 49-1; D 44-1. Dec. 12. 1985. A yea was a vote supporting the 
president's position. (S) (In Comp)
1986 99th Congress Second Session
S Con Res 120. Budget Resolution. Fiscal 1987. D'Amato. R-NY. amendment to reduce 
fiscal 1987 budget authority and outlays for furniture and furnishings of the federal 
government by $100 million and to increase fiscal 1987 budget authority and outlays for 
health programs by $100 million to provide increased spending for drug prevention and 
rehabilitation programs. Adopted 82-12; R 46-4; D 36-8. May 1. 1986. (S)
S 655. Campaign Finance/P AC Spending. Boren. D-Okla.. amendment to reduce limits 
on political action committee (PAC) contributions to congressional campaigns, to 
increase limits on individuals contributions, and to require broadcasters to provide equal 
time to subjects of negative advertising by PACs. Adopted 69-30; R 26-27; D 43-3. 
Aug. 12. 1986 (O) (In Comp)
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1987 100th Congress First Session
S 677. FTC Reauthorization/Insurance. Metzenbaum, D-Ohio. amendment to require 
the FTC to study the sale of health insurance to the eiderly and increases in property and 
casualty insurance rates to small business owners and others. Adopted 80-18: R 29-15: 
D 51-3. April 8. 1987. (O)
S Con Res 49. Fiscal 1988 Budget Resolution/Medicare-Medicaid. Chiles. D-Fla.. 
motion to table (kill) the Chafee. R-RI, perfecting amendment, to increase fiscal 1988 
finding for the Medicare and Medicaid programs by $ 1 billion each, and to provide for 
a $2 billion increase in unspecified revenues. Motion agreed to 69-29: R 20-2; D 49-4. 
May 6. 1987. (O)
S 1420. Omnibus Trade Bill/Advanced Civilian Technology Agency. Hollings. D-SC.. 
motion to table (kill) the Glenn. D-Ohio. amendment to reorganize the Department of 
Commerce and the Office of the US Trade Representative and to create an independent 
Advanced Civilian Technology Agency to provide funding for high-risk technology 
development not being undertaken by the government. Motion agreed to 73-21; R 43-3: 
D 30-18. July 14. 1987. (O)
HR 2470. Catastrophic Health Insurance/Passage. Passage of the bill to expand the 
Medicare program to protect beneficiaries from catastrophic health-care costs and to 
otherwise expand the Medicare and federal-state Medicaid programs. Passed 86-11: R 
36-10; D 50-1. Oct. 27. 1987. A yea was a vote supporting the president's position.(O) 
(In Comp)
1988 100th Congress Second Session
S 2. Campaign Finance/Cloture. Byrd. D-W.Va.. motion to invoke cloture (thus limiting 
debate) on the bill to overhaul federal campaign-finance law. S 2 would limit campaign 
spending and the role o f political action committees in Senate elections. Motion rejected 
53-41; R 3-39: D 50-2. Feb. 26. 1988. A three-fifths majority vote (60) o f the total 
Senate is required to invoke cloture. (O) (In Comp)
S Con Res 113. Fiscal 1989 Budget Resolution/Health Care. Chiles. D-Fla.. motion to 
table (kill) the Weicker. R-Conn.. amendment to transfer $50 million from the science 
function to health functions and to increase spending for childhood immunizations, 
geriatric training for nurses and other health programs. Motion agreed to 57-38: R 27- 
19; D 30-19. April 14. 1988. (O)
S 1220. AIDS Research and Education/Passage. Passage of the bill to authorize 
approximately $645 million for AIDS information, education and treatment programs 
and unspecified sums for research, for fiscal year 19088. Passed 87-4: R 39-4; D 48-0. 
April 28. 1988. (S) (In Comp)
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HR 2470. Catastrophic Health Insurance/Conference Report. Adoption o f the conference 
report on the bill (thus clearing the measure for the president) to cap the amounts for 
which Medicare beneficiaries will be financially liable for Medicare-covered services and 
to make other changes in the program. Adopted 86-11: R 34-i I; D 52-0. June 8. 1988. 
(O) (In Comp)
HR 4783. Fiscal 1989 Labor, Health and Human Services. Education 
Appropriations/Contraceptives for Minors. Chiles. D-Fla.. motion to table (kill) the 
Helms. R-NC. amendment to an Appropriations Committee amendment. The Helms 
amendment would have cut off all funds to the Department o f Health and Human 
Services after Jan. 1. 1989. unless the secretary published regulations prohibiting minors 
(unmarried children under 18) from obtaining contraceptives without written permission 
from their parent or guardian. Motion agreed to 54-34: R 14-25: D 40-9. July 25. 
1988. (S) (In Comp)
1990 101st Congress Second Session
S 1630. Clean Air Act Reauthorization/Passage. Passage of the bill to provide for 
attainment and maintenance of health ambient air quality standards, to limit the 
maximum allowable concentration of so-called criteria pollutants (ozone, lead, sulfur 
dioxide, particulates, nitrogen dioxide and carbon monoxide) and to require emissions 
reductions in motor vehicles; to limit emissions of airborne toxins: to require major 
utilities to reduce emissions of oxides of sulfur and nitrogen, precursors of acid rain; 
and to establish a system of federal permits and enforcement. Passed 89-11; R 39-6: D 
50-5. April 3. 1990. A yea was a vote supporting the president's position. (S) (In 
Comp)
HR 4404. Fiscal 1990 Supplemental Appropriation/Domestic Redistribution. Kasten. 
R-Wis.. motion to table (kill) the Byrd. D-W.Va.. amendment to reduce aid to Panama 
by $120 million and use the fund for American Indian health facilities. Energy 
Department environmental restoration and waste-management projects, agriculture 
disaster assistance programs, and food programs for women and infants. Motion agreed 
to 51-48: R 43-2: D 8-46. April 26. 1990. (O) (In Comp)
S 2240. AIDS Emergency Relief/Passage. Passage of the bill to authorize $300 million 
annually in fiscal 1991 and 1992 and such sums as necessary for fiscal 1993-95 for 
emergency grants to metropolitan areas reporting more than 2.000 cases of AIDS and 
the same amounts in grant to states to develop or improve comprehensive care for 
people infected with HIV. the infection that causes AIDS. Passed 95-4; R 40-4; D 55-0. 
May 16. 1990. (S) (In Comp)
S 341. Air Travel Rights for the Blind/Cloture. Mitchell, D-Maine. motion to invoke 
cloture (thus limiting debate) on the bill to amend the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 to 
prohibit discrimination against blind people in air travel. Rejected 56-44; R 6-39: D 50-
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5. June 12. 1990. A three-fifths majority vote (60) o f the total Senate is required to 
invoke cloture. (S) (In Comp)
S 110. Title X Family Planning Amendments/Counseling. Chafee. R-RL, amendment 
to the Jeffords, R-Vt., amendment to the committee amendment, to specify that pregnant 
women receiving family planning services at federally funded facilities, upon request, 
be advised of all their legal and medical options, including abortion. Adopted 62-36: 
R 16-27; D 46-9. Sept. 25. 1990. (S) (In Comp)
1991 102nd Congress First Session
S 323. Title X Pregnancy Counseling/Parental Consent. Mitchell. D-Maine. amendment 
to require entities that receive Title X finding to obtain consent from a parent, 
grandparent, adult sibling, aunt or uncle for a minor to have an abortion. If the consent 
if not forthcoming, the attending physician could give parents or guardians 48 hours' 
notice before the abortion. The amendment also contains court or clergy bypass 
provisions. Adopted 54-45: R 9-34: D 45-11. July 16. 1990. (O) (In Comp)
HR 2622. Fiscal 1992 treasury-Postal Appropriation/AIDS. Helms. R-NC.. amendment 
to provide for a $10,000 fine and a prison term of not less than 10 years for health-care 
providers who knowingly have the AIDS virus and perform invasive medical procedures 
without notifying the patient. Adopted 81-18: R 36-7; D 45-11. July 18. 1991. (O) (In 
Comp)
HR 2707. Fiscal 1992 Labor. HHS and Education Appropriations/Conference Report. 
Adoption of the conference report (thus clearing the measure for the president) to 
provide $204,919,763,000 in new budget authority for the Departments of Labor. Health 
and Human Services, and Education and related agencies. $176,796,071,000 in fiscal 
1992. $27,848,692,000 in fiscal 1993. and $275,000,000 in fiscal 1994. The 
administration requested $200.6111.414.000. The measure would block enforcement of 
the administration rule, known as the 'gag rule", barring abortion counseling in federally 
funded family planning clinics. Adopted 73-24: R 21-21; D 52-3. Nov. 7. 1991. A nay 
was a vote supporting the president’s position. (S) (In Comp)
1992 102nd Congress Second Session
HR 4210. 1992 Tax Bill/Prescription Drug Costs. Bentsen. D-Texas. motion to table 
(kill) the Pryor. D-Ark.. amendment to contain the cost of prescription drugs by denying 
certain tax breaks to drug companies that raise prices above the rate of inflation as 
reflected in the Consumer Price Index. Motion agreed to 61-36; R 41-2; D 20-34. 
March 11. 1992. (S)
HR 2507. National Institutes of Health Reauthorization/Passage. Passage of the bill to 
reauthorize and amend the programs of NIH. including $2.2 billion for the National
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Cancer Institute and $ 1.5 billion for the Heart. Lung and Blood Institute. The bill would 
lift the ban on fetal tissue transplant research, including fetal tissue obtained from 
induced abortions. Passed 87- 10; R 33-9: D 54-1. April 2. 1992. A nay was a vote 
supporting the president's position. (S) (In Comp)
S 3. Campaign Finance/Conference Report. Adoption of the conference report to limit 
spending (H Rept 102-487) in congressional campaigns by providing incentives to 
candidates to agree to voluntary spending limits, restricting money that candidates can 
accept from political action committees and restricting "soft money” raised and spent by 
state parties in federal elections. Adopted (thus cleared for the president) 58-42; R 3-40: 
D 55-2. April 30. 1992. A nay was a vote supporting the president’s position. (O) (In 
Cpmp)
88 S 3. Campaign Finance/Veto Override. Passage, over President Bush's May 9 veto, 
of the bill to limit spending in congressional campaigns by providing incentives to 
candidates to agree to voluntary spending limits, restricting money that candidates can 
accept from political action committees (PACs) and restricting "soft money" raised and 
spent by state parties in federal elections. Rejected 57-42; R 3-40; D 54-2. May 13. 
1992. A two-thirds majority of those present and voting (66 in this case) of both houses 
is required to override a veto. A nay was a vote supporting the president’s position. (O) 
(In Comp)
HR 11. Tax Bill/Tobacco Advertising. Ford. D-K.y.. motion to table (kill) the Harkin. 
D-Iowa. amendment to reduce the tax deductibility on advertising for tobacco products 
from 100 percent to 80 percent with the revenue generated going to anti-smoking 
campaigns. Motion agreed to 56-38; R 28-14: D 28-24. Sept. 24. 1992. (O) (In Comp)
S 323. Family Planning Amendments /Veto Override. Passage, over President Bush's 
Sept 25 veto, of the bill to reauthorize Title X of the Public Health Service Act for five 
years through fiscal 1997. The bill overturned the administration’s "gag rule" and thus 
allowed abortion counseling at federally funded clinics. Passed (thus cleared for House 
action) 73-26: R 20-23: D 53-3. Oct. 1. 1992. A two-thirds majority of those present 
and voting (66 in this case) was required to override a veto. A nay was a note in 
support of the president’s position. (S) (In Comp)
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APPENDIX C: INDIVIDUAL VOTE EQUATION RESULTS
Table C.l 
Vote Equation Results 
Probit Estimates and t-Statistics 
1979-1982
S 440 HR 3236 S Con Res 19 S 1377 HR 4961 S J Res 58 H J Res 
631
AMAS -.001143 .0000119 .0000405 -.0000231 .0000763 .0000366 .0000192
(-.0352) (.3391) (.8374) (-.388) (1.052) (.3426) (.3658)
%AMA 3.1669 -1.9208 -2.389 -1.397 -.9984 6.928 6.755
(1.5647) (-1.0588) (-1.325) (-.823) (-.4254) (1.81) (2.752)
AMAOPPS .00675 -.0000316 .0000133 .0001123 .0002503 .0001476 -.0001141










- - - -
VOTE 2.1666 .9725 -.8923 2.755 .5645 -.0407 -1.297
MARGIN (.9741) (.6527) (-.6435) (1.699) (.2402) (-.0168) (-.7822)
PARTY .2065 -.4168 -.304 -.3552 -2.988 .6898 -.691
(.5581) (-1.117) (-.7997) (-.9187) (-5.014) (1.115) (-1.286)
ADA -.01047 -.02578 .0221 .0312 .0225 -.071 -.0254
(-1.2354) (-2.866) (2.637) (3.527) (1.689) (-3.787) (-2.373)
TENURE .0538 .0294 .0304 -.014 .0379 .021 -.02
(2.094) (1.7) (1.4949) (-.6452) (1.127) (.5832) (-.871)
%ELDERLY -9.4473 7.281 5.446 -3.17 10.932 -8.007 -25.05
(-1.0467) (-789) (.667) (-.3338) (.8449) (-.534) (-1.95)
INCOME -.000615 .0002282 -.0000976 .0006699 .0002165 -.000205 -.001197
(-2.492) (1.056) (-.5138) (2.257) (.8225) (-.6351) (-2.711)
EAST .7177 .0998 -.4692 .031 -.6807 -.4599 -1.663
(1.361) (.1829) (-.9038) (.058) (-.8997) (-.6708) (-2.23)
SOUTH -.19151 .4096 -.4266 1.12 .5607 .5141 -1.644
(-.3443) (.8057) (-.9005) (2.025) (.7127) (.5478) (-2.409)
MIDWEST .365 .4369 -.2212 .1834 .4209 -.3155 -1.706
(.6318) (.7825) (-.4285) (.3366) (.5139) (-.3747) (-2.708)
CONSTANT 2.6937 -1.7978 1.441 -5.45 -1.89 2.073 8.39
(.8908) (-.6897) (•716) (-2.044) (-.665) (.5466) (2.198)
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Table C.2 
Vote Equation Results 
Probit Estimates and t-Statistics 
1983-1984
HR 1900 S Con Res 27a S J Res 3 HR 2163 HR 4616
AMAS .0000302 .0000058 .0000256 .0000298 .0001102
(.3323) (.0376) (.4131) (.3578) (1.494)
%AMA 2.492 42.413 4.745 1.058 7.915
(.9067) (1-54) (1.62) (-434) (2.067)
AMAOPPS -.001542 -.000489 .0000584 -.0001198 .00376
(-.0011) (-.874) (.5237) (-.63) (.0016)
OTHGRPS - - -.00456
(-126)
- -
SYNERGY - - -2.569
(-.028)
- -
VOTE MARGIN 3.603 -15.002 .6117 -3.746 4.575
(.8356) (-1.182) (.2332) (-1.304) (1.551)
PARTY -2.558 -18.01 1.017 1.893 1.063
(-1.844) (-1.721) (1.569) (2.913) (1.704)
ADA -.0793 .2099 .0474 -.0354 .022
(-2.388) (1.93) (4.006) (-3.01) (2.067)
TENURE -.1414 -.1379 .0482 .0676 -.0186
(-1.396) (-1.221) (1.768) (1.989) (-.744)
%ELDERLY -18.608 -258.68 -6.831 - I I . 71 2.051
(-.7357) (-1.739) (-.599) (-.78) (.1795)
INCOME -.0004 -.0017 .000479 .0005326 .0003247
(-1.482) (-1.35) (2.609) (2.26) (1.878)
EAST -5.782 16.712 2.026 -.5282 1.948
(-.0013) (1-78) (1.885) (-.6815) (2.436)
SOUTH -.3891 -1.223 -.0316 .5432 1.324
(-.4606) (-.5326) (-.0467) (.5742) (2.08)
MIDWEST -.9297 -2.054 -1.547 -.306 .4349
(-.7055) (-.542) (-1.909) (-.336) (.4811)
CONSTANT 5.47 20.174 -10.266 -1.649 -12.064
(.8882) (1.065) (-2.54) (-.4385) (-2.852)
a Due to the relative lack of variation in the dependent variable, results are questionable. 
Vote passed 90-9.
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Table C.3 
Vote Equation Results 
Probit Estimates and t-Statistics 
1985-1986
S 484 S 43 S 1078 S 1730 Bowen
Nom.a
S Con Res 
120
S 655
AMAS -.000104 .0000098 .0000122 -.000019 .002116 .0000355 .000058
(-.954) (.4485) (.781) (-.432) (.00005) (.4074) (1.359)
%AMA -1.7055 .5315 1.31 1.646 183.42 -1.475 1.173
(-.948) (.3287) (.788) (.875) (.0005) (-.677) (.672)
AMAOPPS .00014 -.000001 -.0000042 .0000022 .00375 .0002277 .000011
(1.359) (-.3145) (-.1143) (.048) (.0003) (.888) (.423)
OTHGRPS - - - - - - -
SYNERGY - - - - - - -
VOTE MARGIN 1.1623 2.337 1.21 .5527 379.49 -1.099 -4.004
(.483) (1.079) (.611) (.229) (.0008) (-.403) (-1.683)
PARTY -.429 .04297 .2076 -1.843 -4.24 .438 .8858
(-.7494) (.0768) (.406) (-3.45) (.00004) (.632) (1.681)
ADA .02512 -.0503 -.0188 .032 -.249 .0034 -.016
(2.566) (-3.868) (-2.153) (2.915) (-.0002) (.323) (-1.832)
TENURE .0655 .0082 -.0405 -.087 -.713 -.0121 .0343
(2.553) (.3475) (-1.552) (-2.59) (-.0004) (-.443) (1.384)
%ELDERLY 24.572 .775 -8.671 -1.474 641.55 44.9 -12.644
(1.92) (.0668) (-.824) (-.118) (.0002) (2.09) (-1.1)
INCOME .485 -.000171 -.0001633 .000027 .02109 .0001321 -.0000424
(2.44) (-1.023) (-1.141) (.148) (.0008) (.523) (-.285)
EAST -.3568 1.251 .468 .0558 44.2 -8.322 -.054
(-.5747) (2.028) (.833) (.0816) (.0005) (-.0003) (-.09)
SOUTH -.0402 -1.277 -.1682 .017 -23.23 -8.034 -.674
(-.051) (-1.697) (-.31) (.022) (-.0005) (-.0003) (-1.182)
MIDWEST .595 .1146 -.63 -.984 -36.73 -9.224 .063
(.844) (.175) (-.986) (-1.239) (-.0005) (-.0003) (.10)
CONSTANT -9.528 2.653 1.449 -.848 -511.36 4.442 2.698
(-2.748) (.9181) (.546) (-.259) (-.001) (.0001) (.955)
a Due to the relative lack of variation in the dependent variable, results are 
questionable. Vote passed 93-2.
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Table C.4 
Vote Equation Results 
Probit Estimates and t-Statistics 
1987-1988
S 677 S Con Res 
49
S 1420 HR 2470 S 2 S Con 
Res 113
S 12201 HR 2470 HR 4783
AMAS .000006 .00007 -.00005 .000022 .000128 -.00004 -.00138 .000024 -.0001
(.40) (1.668) (-.611) (1.299) (1.166) (-.633) (-.0005) (1.226) (-1.694)
% AMA 1.80 2.158 -3.338 1.724 4.308 -.454 112.6 3.827 -2.754
(.964) (1.168) (-1.624) (.826) (1.099) (-.262) (.0006) (1.518) (-1.577)
AMAOPPS -.00004 -.00284 -.00001 .000009 -.00044 -.00001 -.00084 .000017 .00001
(-.301) (-.01) (-.781) (.414) (-.183) (-.654) (-.0009) (.581) (.322)
OTHGRPS - - - - - - - - -
SYNERGY - - - - - - - - -
VOTE -1.626 1.628 3.828 4.45 -2.934 1.539 58.31 6.311 -1.57
MARGIN (-.707) (.778) (1.733) (1.55) (-.664) (.766) (.0009) (1.892) (-.2732)
PARTY .46 1.923 -.321 -.798 2.545 .8464 54.08 1.088 .557
(.842) (3.374) (-.594) (-987) (2.401) (1.537) (.002) (1.062) (1.03)
ADA -.0145 .0085 .016 -.05 -.0838 .0169 3.019 -.0489 .0397
(-1.568) (.955) (1.83) (-2.71) (-2.49) (2.024) (.0016) (-2.89) (4.05)
TENURE .025 .0098 -.0269 .0272 -.0039 .0177 -.784 .0118 .0171
(1.0) (.378) (-1.053) (.877) (-.075) (.7667) (-.0008) (.29) (.69)
%ELDERLY -5.05 9.007 -8.535 8.941 34.42 4.314 -146.4 50.34 17.194
(-.463) (.8025) (-.925) (.6043) (1.539) (.472) (-.0004) (2.66) (1.226)
INCOME .000222 -.00005 .000056 .000049 .000244 .00012 .00362 .00045 .00027
(1.244) (-.333) (.39) (.22) (.7466) (.791) (.0004) (1.677) (1.334)
EAST -.596 -.049 -.459 .792 -1.051 1.33 20.34 -.926 -.1258
(-.858) (-.074) (-.778) (.829) (-.94) (2.252) (.0005) (-1.024) (-.175)
SOUTH -.508 -l.l .225 -.64 -3.022 -.396 10.71 -1.266 1.804
(-.887) (-1.797) (.384) (-.893) (-2.0) (-.717) (.0006) (-1.55) (2.805)
MIDWEST -.828 -.631 .579 -.789 -3.458 .0634 63.07 -3.535 .826
(-1.175) (-.909) (.841) (-.71) (-1.938) (.1023) (.0003) (-2.666) (1.16)
CONSTANT -2.065 -4.49 -t.244 -4.789 -3.052 -1.0 -162.5 -15.99 -4.292
(-.663) (-1.518) (-.46) (-1.147) (-.541) (-1.458) (-.0008) (-2.73) (-1.3)
a Due to the relative lack of variation in the dependent variable, results are questionable 
Bill passed 87-4.
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Table C.5 
Vote Equation Results 
Probit Estimates and t-Statistics 
1989-1990
S 1630 HR 4404 S 2240a S 341 S 110
AMAS -.00019 -.0001967 -.000404 .0001709 -.000033
(-1.959) (-2.12) (-.0002) (1.91) (-1.722)
%AMA 1.392 1.344 -28.74 -.436 -.5977
(.567) (.555) (-.0001) (-.213) (-.352)
AMAOPPS .000011 .0000106 -.000274 .0000062 .0000034
(.3232) (.312) (-.00009) (.33) (.175)
OTHGRPS .0000265 - .02798 .0001723 -.0001064
(.2334) (.0006) (1.135) (-1.441)
SYNERGY -1.53E-8 - -.000037 -2.05E-7 -4.132E-7
(-.2096) (-.0002) (-1.274) (-.035)
VOTE MARGIN -3.735 -3.69 420.0 2.154 -1.552
(-1.256) (-1.245) (.0002) (.797) (-.641)
PARTY -2.8698 -2.878 18.665 -3.786 .932
(-3.096) (-3.127) (.0001) (-3.544) (1.256)
ADA .0192 .0188 .607 -.00035 .048
(1.31) (1.30) (.00008) (-.0316) (3.833)
TENURE .0326 .0323 -1.798 .0092 .051
(.8765) (.8689) (-.0003) (.254) (1.525)
%ELDERLY -29.85 -30.05 998.4 20.113 1.034
(-1.8058) (-1.834) (.0001) (1.289) (.075)
INCOME -.00067 -.000679 .01414 -.000471 .000544
(-2.302) (-2.34) (.00008) (-1.737) (2.532)
EAST 1.404 1.40 -92.4 .807 .1814
(1.464) (1.457) (-.0002) (1.1) (.23)
SOUTH -.0762 -.075 -10.73 -1.243 .406
(-.0972) (-.095) (-.0001) (-1.361) (.626)
MIDWEST 2.0293 2.01 -36.86 -.2157 -.249
(1.875) (1.877) (-.0001) (-.254) (-.318)
CONSTANT -10.156 10.32 -412.2 2.286 -5.796
(-2.092) (2.159) (-.0001) (.587) (-1.725)
a Due to the relative lack of variation in the dependent variable, results are 
questionable. Vote passed 95-4.
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Table C.6 
Vote Equation Results 
Probit Estimates and t-Statistics 
1991-1992
S 323 HR 2622 HR 2707 HR 4210 HR 2507 S 3 S 3 HR 11 S 323
AMAS .00011 -.00014 .0001 .000123 -.00005 .000048 .000048 .000013 .000082
(1.395) (-1.47) (1.146) (1.416) (-.573) (.483) (.483) (.16) (.874)
%AMA .9288 -3.775 .4266 -.913 2.937 2.262 2.262 .435 1.489
(.571) (-1.74) (.216) (-.564) (1.158) (.5652) (.5652) (.269) (.688)
AMAOPPS -.00017 .00001 -.00012 -.00051 -.00038 .0076 .0076 -.00001 -.00013
(-.407) (.108) (-.304) (-.821) (-1.555) (.0016) (.0016) (-.137) (-.254)
















VOTE MARGIN -2.636 6.761 5.087 -2.213 .7616 -7.648 -7.648 1.696 .699
(-1.323) (2.76) (1.937) (-1.179) (.284) (1.442) (1.442) (.8652) (.292)
PARTY -.645 1.984 -.43 .427 .706 66.94 66.94 1.182 -1.282
(-.843) (2.326) (-.422) (.577) (.663) (.002) (.002) (1.507) (-1.24)
ADA -.05 .0387 .0489 -.034 .055 -.052 -.052 .0357 .0319
(-3.61) (2.976) (2.388) (-2.83) (1.909) (-1.84) (-1.84) (2.869) (1.776)
TENURE .0176 -.0042 -.0695 -.0035 .0376 .1449 .1449 .0196 -.0363
(.625) (-.173) (-1.71) (-.135) (1.095) (1.984) (1.984) (.815) (-.948)
%ELDERLY 8.321 8.9 1.098 9.611 -2.66 5.667 5.667 -7.161 -5.727
(.849) (.808) (.087) (.781) (-.156) (.296) (.296) (-.5723) (-.418)
INCOME -.00004 .000056 .000535 .000228 .000642 .000119 .00012 -.00036 .000708
(-.241) (.398) (2.42) (1.59) (2.11) (.329) (.329) (-2.36) (2.92)
EAST -.591 -1.27 -.26 -.00076 -1.278 1.191 1.191 1.269 .652
(-.859) (-1.86) (-.254) (-.001) (-1.036) (.851) (.851) (1.758) (.558)
SOUTH -.669 -.684 -.191 .264 .0759 64.83 64.83 -1.907 -.542
(-1.09) (-.925) (-.247) (.429) (.098) (.002) (.002) (-2.623) (-.686)
MIDWEST -.072 .13 -.056 -.153 -.801 -.522 -.522 -.4018 -.369
(-.117) (.206) (-.297) (-.242) (-.733) (-.447) (-.447) (-.704) (-.44)
CONSTANT 2.731 -6.932 -8.45 .187 -8.532 -64.45 -64.45 .7793 -6.453
(.9702) (-1.984) (-2.25) (.064) (-1.88) (-.002) (-.002) (.249) (-1.873)
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APPENDIX D: BOOTSTRAP RESULTS
Table D.l
Bootstrap Results for AMA Contributions 
Nboot=Number of Pseudo-Datasets Used for Estimation 








-3613.54 172.5838 -20.9379 -3781.3 121.6051 -31.0949
PARTY -3163.55 108.63S5 -29.12 -3110.65 75.24924 -41.338
CAMPGN 941.56 151.0549 6.233 1045.87 106.8992 9.7837
INCUMBENCY -518.91 90.92434 -5.707 -372.81 64.72645 -5.75978
TOTALOPPS -.00052 .000044 -11.8712 -.0005 .0000312 -15.946
ADA -59.7397 1.803735 -33.12 -57.2434 1.279205 -44.7492
EAST -464.8 122.5817 -3.79176 -534.66 86.59328 -6.17438
SOUTH -1544.25 116.227 -13.286 -1427.52 80.94451 -17.6358
MIDWEST -1109.11 124.7806 -8.888 -1057.66 86.83298 -12.1804
BUDGET -596.895 100.382 -5.946 -621.797 68.34852 -9.09745
FINANCE -813.11 107.8715 -7.53777 -765.05 76.57613 -9.99071
FOREIGN
RELATIONS
-68.72 107.5813 -.63877 -119.02 77.86571 -1.52853
GOVT AFFAIRS 828.41 93.373 8.872 800.86 69.00374 11.60604
SMALL
BUSINESS
-396.73 97.4317 -4.0719 -530.625 71.60883 -7.41005
CONSTANT 48539.19 223.656 217.0261 58335.36 159.7481 365.1708
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Table D.2
Bootstrap Results for AMA Contributions 
Nboot=Number of Pseudo-Datasets Used for Estimation 








-620.419 105.995 -5.853 -639.876 76.06037 -8.41274
PARTY -2685.41 109.454 -24.535 -2623.22 75.82415 -34.5961
CAMPGN 1071.838 150.99 7.099 1172.158 106.989 10.95587
INCUMBENCY -485.62 90.707 -5.354 -348.92 64.59932 -5.40129
TOTALOPPS -.00045 .0000439 -10.326 -.00043 .0000312 -13.7309
ADA -54.0146 1.815 -29.765 -51.5161 1.284315 -40.1118
EAST -554.68 121.466 -4.567 -630.28 86.00194 -7.32867
SOUTH -1424.21 116.147 -12.262 -1311.72 81.14468 -16.1652
MIDWEST -1103.28 124.424 -8.867 -1059 86.69479 -12.2153
BUDGET -534.709 99.759 -5.360 -554.78 67.78943 -8.18387
FINANCE -732.38 107.372 -6.821 -685.43 76.36236 -8.97602
FOREIGN
RELATIONS
37.57 106.59 .3525 -7.69 77.00779 -.09986
GOVT
AFFAIRS
690.82 94.635 7.30 664.52 69.99417 9.493934
SMALL
BUSINESS
-295.12 98.034 -3.010 -427.72 72.19986 -5.92411
CONSTANT 60554.05 226.818 266.972 60274.15 160.0261 376.652
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Table D.3
Bootstrap Results for AMA Contributions 
Nboot=Number of Pseudo-Datasets Used for Estimation 








-1062.06 125.515 -8.462 -1171.19 86.00636 -13.6175
PARTY -2725.11 109.629 -24.858 -2668.92 75.64801 -35.2808
CAMPGN 976.35 150.954 6.468 1068.73 106.4568 10.03909
INCUMBENCY -631.91 91.492 -6.907 -495.61 65.24633 -7.59598
TOTALOPPS -.00049 .0000438 -11.142 -.0046 .000311 -1.4894
.ADA -53.6675 1.8087 -29.672 -51.0594 1.275656 -40.026
EAST -560.38 122.362 -4.580 -626.76 86.27958 -7.26429
SOUTH -1385.13 117.445 -11.794 -1263.35 81.92418 -15.4209
MIDWEST -1062.87 124.802 -8.516 -1017.55 86.78207 -11.7253
BUDGET -573.305 101.431 -5.652 -592.552 68.72483 -8.6221
FINANCE -720.72 107.132 -6.728 -671.92 75.94874 -8.84702
FOREIGN
RELATIONS
43.0 106.299 .4045 9.02 76.65835 .117665
GOVT
AFFAIRS
810.45 94.672 8.561 787.38 69.60679 11.31183
SMALL
BUSINESS
-352.83 97.347 -3.624 -490.03 71.76694 -6.82807
CONSTANT 59196.34 221.464 267.295 58965.17 157.126 375.2732
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Table D.4
Bootstrap Results for VOTE MARGIN Equation 




Bias SD(Bias) Bias t- 
stat
VOTE INDEX .0059 .0004 15.06 .0065 .0003 23.90
TOTALOPPS -9.9E-9 7.1E-11 -138.89 -9.9E-9 4.98E-11 -198.8
INCUMBENCY .0139 .0002 67.724 .0138 .0001 93.32
LAGGED VOTE 
MARGIN
.5366 .0023 233.68 .5350 .0016 327.1
%WHITE -.0464 .0013 -35.524 -.0463 .0009 -49.30
%ELDERLY .0846 .0049 17.225 .0835 .0034 24.57
INCOME 9.2E-7 4.92E-8 18.702 9.29E-7 3.4E-8 27.32
CONSTANT -.2684 .0020 -134.72 -.2677 .0014 -188.6
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APPENDIX E: AMA CONTRIBUTION EQUATIONS: 
SENATE COMMITTEE MEMBERS VERSUS NON-MEMBERS
Table E.l 
Vote Indices Equations 
Senate Budget Committee Members 
GLS Estimates and t-Statistics
Full Vote Index Narrow Vote Index Broad Vote Index
Interest Group Variables
AMAS 0.000002781 0.000002312 0.000000756
(+ ) (1.178) (0.519) (0.216)
fcAMA -0.030676 0.205589 -0.17654!
(+ ) (0.183) (0.862) (0.711)
AMAOPPS -0.000001443 -0.000001866 -0.000000712
(-) (1.176) (1.066) (0.391)
Control Variables
VOTE MARGIN 0.248608 0.068989 0.421236
(?) (0.964) (0.187) (1.099)
PARTY -0.099437 0.073023 -0.082269
(?) (1.379) (0.710) (0.768)
ADA -0.000298 0.000092022 0.000387
(?) (0.277) (0.060) (0.242)
TENURE 0.000323 0.000591 -0.000301
(?) (0.108) (0.139) (0.068)
%ELDERLY 0.344049 -0.312969 0.519782
(?) (0.290) (0.185) (0.295)
INCOME -0.000021292* 0.000007344 -0.000014299
(?) (2.192) (0.530) (0.991)
EAST 0.026608 0.000611 0.007979
(?) (0.341) (0.006) (0.069)
SOUTH -0.017275 0.047851 0.026926
(?) (0.244) (0.473) (0.256)
MIDWEST -0.002214 -0.060671 0.058231
(?) (0.032) (0.610) (0.562)
CONSTANT 0.594764 0.162372 0.504326
(2.709) (0.519) (1.547)
F-Value 1.235 0.513 0.617
* Significant at the .05 level
140
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Table E.2 
Vote Indices Equations 
Senate Finance Committee Members 
GLS Estimates and t-Statistics
Full Vote Index Narrow Vote Index Broad Vote Index
Interest Grout) Variables 
AMAS 0.000000610 0.000001456 0.000001210
(+ ) (0.315) (0.589) (0.442)
%AMA -0.012341 0.279260 -0.227368
( +  ) (0.064) (1.134) (0.833)
AMAOPPS 0.000000892 -0.000007603 0.000035273
(-) (0.049) (0.324) (1.357)
Control Variables 
VOTE MARGIN 0.164564 -0.138671 0.256164
(?) (0.692) (0.456) (0.761)
PARTY -0.002438 -0.122401 0.126293
(?) (0.035) (1.376) (1.281)
ADA 0.000028534 -0.002220 0.002480
(?) (0.025) (1.494) (1.505)
TENURE 0.007459* 0.009353* 0.004614
(?) (2.047) (2.008) (0.894)
%ELDERLY 1.831419 4.210257* 2.335006
(?) (1.444) (2.597) (1.299)
INCOME -0.000005337 0.000000145 0.000007654
(?) (0.490) (0.010) (0.496)
EAST 0.070566 -0.075312 0.048252
(?) (1.104) (0.921) (0.533)
SOUTH 0.047324 -0.276876* 0.247228*
(?) (0.554) (2.536) (2.043)
MIDWEST -0.020478 -0.186470 0.024600
(?) (0.274) (.948) (0.232)
CONSTANT 1.219 0.021500 -0.063225
(0.720) (0.075) (0.200)
F-Value 1.219 1.326 1.313
* Significant at the .05 level.
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Table E.3 
Vote Indices Equations 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee Members 
GLS Estimates and t-Statistics
Full Vote Index Narrow Vote Index Broad Vote Index
Interest GrouD Variables 
AMAS 0.000022260* 0.000006230 0.000006080
(+ ) (4.260) (0.651) (0.703)
%AMA -0.053287 0.020352 -0.021215
(+ ) (0.299) (0.062) (0.072)
AMAOPPS -0.000036738* -0.000036355* -0.000034245*
(-) (3.287) (1.776) (1.852)
Control Variables 
VOTE MARGIN 0.476982 0.740243 0.245381
(?) (1.952) (1.654) (0.607)
PARTY -0.121253* -0.090391 -0.058326
(?) (2.340) (0.952) (0.680)
ADA -0.000058781 -0.000974 0.000604
(?) (0.067) (0.609) (0.418)
TENURE 0.007615* 0.004490 0.008142
(?) (2.855) (0.919) (1.845)
%ELDERLY -0.737786 -0.164097 0.314415
(?) (0.889) (0.108) (0.229)
INCOME 0.000007271 0.000005616 0.000044811*
(?) (0.956) (0.403) (3.563)
EAST -0.031918 -0.121185 -0.010664
(?) (0.501) (1.039) (0.101)
SOUTH -0.071233 -0.078929 0.023551
(?) (0.947) (0.573) (0.189)
MIDWEST -0.027423 -0.109688 0.042052
(?) (0.336) (0.733) (0.311)
CONSTANT 0.293744 0.047851 -0.057073
(1.533) (0.136) (0.180)
F-Value 4.551* 0.747 2.053*
* Significant at the .05 level.
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Table E.4 
Vote Indices Equations 
Senate Governmental Affairs Committee Members 
GLS Estimates and t-Statistics
Full Vote Index Narrow Vote Index Broad Vote Index
Interest G to u d  Variables
AMAS 0.000005584 -0.000012098 -0.000003759
(+ ) (0.946) (1.377) (0.442)
%AMA 0.107356 0.504618 0.307000
( +  ) (0.430) (1.357) (0.853)
AMAOPPS -0.000009925 0.000007585 -0.000017974
(-) (0.777) (0.399) (0.977)
Control Variables
VOTE MARGIN -0.087651 0.116270 -0.044906
(?) (0.328) (0.292) (0.117)
PARTY -0.113052 0.060590 0.011108
(?) (1.404) (0.506) (0.096)
ADA -0.001356 0.000405 -0.000037185
(?) (0.964) (0.194) (0.018)
TENURE 0.004815 0.002564 -0.005577
(?) (1.058) (0.379) (0.851)
%ELDERLY -0.210063 0.893325 -0.476788
(?) (0.194) (0.555) (0.306)
INCOME -0.000013169 -0.000004371 0.000006920
(?) (1.260) (0.281) (0.460)
EAST 0.048708 -0.104190 0.065447
(?) (0.548) (0.788) (0.512)
SOUTH -0.053566 -0.211622 0.112922
(?) (0.489) (1.299) (0.716)
MIDWEST -0.081980 -0.250840 -0.050418
(?) (0.788) (1.620) (0.337)
CONSTANT 0.772961 0.073518 0.512445
(2.569) (0.164) (1.183)
F-Value 0.746 0.576 0.452
* Significant at the .05 level.
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Table E.5 
Vote Indices Equations 
Senate Small Business Committee Members 
GLS Estimates and t-Statistics
Full Vote Index Narrow Vote Index Broad Vote Index
Interest GrouD Variables
AMAS -0.000002323 -0.000003944 -0.000003152
(+ ) (0.828) (1.018) (0.817)
%AMA -0.059660 0.121475 0.147876
( +  ) (0.250) (0.368) (0.450)
AMAOPPS -0.000001662 -0.000003221 0.000000819
(-) (0.439) (0.616) (0.157)
Control Variables
VOTE MARGIN 0.112291 -0.462047 0.136805
(?) (0.392) (1.169) (0.348)
PARTY 0.038305 -0.073294 0.052444
(?) (0.552) (0.765) (0.550)
ADA 0.001306 -0.000846 0.002176
(?) (1.234) (0.579) (1.496)
TENURE 0.001985 0.006992 0.002376
(?) (0.423) (1.079) (0.368)
%ELDERLY 0.349302 0.219809 -0.275049
(?) (0.267) (0.122) (0.153)
INCOME 0.000009007 0.000002442 0.000025710
(?) (0.836) (0.164) (1.735)
EAST 0.025280 0.057396 0.074630
(?) (0.275) (0.452) (0.591)
SOUTH 0.081844 0.040020 0.093250
(?) (1.008) (0.357) (0.835)
MIDWEST 0.053293 0.056847 0.026689
(?) (0.686) (0.530) (0.250)
CONSTANT 0.224627 0.549730 0.042823
(0.850) (1.506) (0.118)
F-Value 0.537 0.379 0.918
* Significant at the .05 level.
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Veterans of Foreign Wars PAC 
INSURANCE.
Allstate Insurance PAC
National Association of Independent Insurers PAC
National Association of Life Underwriters
Independent Insurance Agents of America
ANTI-ABORTION ADVOCATES
National Right To Life PAC
HUMAN RIGHTS ADVOCATES
Human Rights Campaign Fund
AUTOMOBILE MANUFACTURERS
American Motors Candidate Assistance Committee 
Chrysler Corp. Nonpartisan Political Support Comm 
Ford Motor Co. Civic Action Fund 
Civil Involvement Program/General Motors
AIRLINES
American Airlines PAC
Continental Airlines Employees Good Government 
Delta Airlines Inc. PAC 
PAN-AM PAC
United Airlines Inc. Good Government Fund 
US-AIR PAC (aka Allegheny PAC)

























Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
146
PHARMACEUTICALS
Cutter Lab Inc. PAC 1991-92
CIBA-GEIGY Employee Good Government Fund 1991-92
Johnson & Johnson Employees Good Government Fund 1991-92 
Merck PAC 1991-92
Miles Lab PAC 1991-92
Pfizer PAC 1991-92
Squibb Good Government Fund 1991-92
Upjohn PAC 1991-92
TOBACCO PRODUCERS
Tobacco Institute PAC 1991-92
U.S. Tobacco Co. Political Involvement Committee 1991-92
Philip Morris PAC 1991-92
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